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Autonomous machines and vehicles are an increasing part of everyday life and industrial 
operations. These machines and vehicles have enjoyed rapid technological advancements 
in recent years, which has led to increasingly sophisticated functions and functionalities. 
The advancements in autonomous technologies have, however, given rise to questions 
and concerns relating to the safety of these machines and vehicles, and on how an 
adequate level of safety can be ensured when no dedicated operator or driver is present.  
This thesis looks at the main areas that affect the overall safety of autonomous industrial 
machines and civilian road vehicles, and presents the most prominent challenges faced in 
ensuring the safety of autonomous applications. The goal of the thesis is to give the reader 
an overview of the safety-related aspects of autonomy and to show what has to be 
considered when ensuring an adequate level of safety for autonomous machines or 
vehicles. This is achieved by an extensive literature review on autonomous applications 
in both industrial and automotive fields, and on the safety-related aspects of autonomy. 
Additionally, mining is used in the thesis as an example of autonomous machines in 
practice and on the challenges autonomy can face in industrial operations.  
Based on the research carried out, it can be said that the overall safety of machine 
autonomy is currently hindered by two main aspects: the lack of applicable standards, 
legislation and guidelines regarding the autonomy of machines and vehicles, and the 
paradox that arises from balancing the desired level of autonomy with the needed level 
of safety. This has led to a situation where, in theory, highly complex and sophisticated 
autonomous machines are possible from a technical standpoint, but they lack a common 
and thorough method for ensuring an adequate level of safety. 
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Autonomiset työkoneet ja ajoneuvot ovat kasvavissa määrin osana arkielämää ja 
teollisuutta. Lähivuosina nämä laitteet ovat hyötyneet soveltuvien teknologioiden 
nopeasta kehityksestä, mikä on johtanut hyvinkin kehittyneisiin toimintoihin ja 
toiminnallisuuksiin. Autonomisten teknologioiden kehitys on kuitenkin nostanut esille 
kysymyksiä ja huolia näiden laitteiden turvallisuuteen ja sen varmistamiseen liittyen 
etenkin tilanteissa, joissa laitteella ei ole käytännössä selkeää kuljettajaa.  
Tässä diplomityössä tutkitaan tärkeimpiä osa-alueita, jotka vaikuttavat autonomisten 
työkoneiden ja ajoneuvojen turvallisuuteen, sekä esitellään suurimmat haasteet 
autonomisten laitteiden turvallisuuden varmistamisessa. Työn päämääränä on tarjota 
lukijalle kattava katsaus autonomian turvallisuuteen liittyvistä osa-alueista, sekä osoittaa 
mitä tulee huomioida, jotta voidaan saavuttaa tarvittava turvallisuuden taso autonomiselle 
laitteelle. Työn päämäärän perustana on kattava kirjallisuustutkimus autonomisiin 
työkoneisiin ja ajoneuvoihin, sekä näiden turvallisuuteen liittyviin osa-alueisiin liittyen. 
Lisäksi työssä käytetään kaivosteollisuutta autonomian käytännön esimerkkinä, jonka 
avulla esitellään suurimpia haasteita, joita autonomia voi kohdata käytännön 
ympäristöissä.  
Tehdyn tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan todeta, että autonomisten laitteiden 
turvallisuutta jarruttaa tällä hetkellä kaksi pääasiallista seikkaa: sopivien lakien, 
standardien ja ohjeistuksien puute, sekä ristiriita, joka syntyy tasapainoilusta kehittyneen 
autonomian ja riittävän turvallisuuden tason välillä. Tämä on johtanut tilanteeseen, jossa 
teoriassa hyvinkin monimuotoiset ja kehittyneet autonomiset laiteominaisuudet ovat 
teknologian kannalta mahdollisia, mutta näiden toteuttamista varten ei ole olemassa 
yhtenäistä ja kattavaa menetelmää, jolla riittävä turvallisuuden taso voidaan varmistaa. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The nature of industrial machines and the role of their operators is currently in a state of 
change. Traditionally, industrial machines have been human-operated machines that 
perform either manual or automatic functions while requiring almost constant control and 
monitoring of their actions. Therefore, the machines require the presence of an operator, 
which at times requires the operator to expose themselves to hazardous environments and 
other risks. A vision of a machine that can perform these actions autonomously, without 
the need for an operator, has been in the minds of researchers and manufacturers for the 
past several decades. Similarly, in automotive fields, the idea of a completely self-driving 
car has been a vision of the future for a number of years. Due to the advancements in 
technology in recent years, the idea of self-operating machines and self-driving vehicles 
is no longer a distant vision, but rather a possibility of the very near future.  
The automation of machines and their features is, however, nothing new. Numerous 
different automatic functions and features have been available for machines and vehicles 
for years, which have been used to lessen the workload on operators and drivers and in 
some cases to minimise exposure to hazards they might be faced with. The impact of 
autonomy on machines, however, is far more complex. Autonomy offers a way for 
machines or vehicles to gather information on themselves and on their surroundings, and 
importantly, to use this information to make decisions and actions to fulfil a goal they 
have been set – without the need for intervention from the operator or driver, and thus 
eliminating exposure to risks and hazards completely.   
Autonomous machines are therefore highly complex machines that are able to perform 
independent decision-making and to operate without the supervision of an operator. 
Ensuring the safety and safe operation of such a machine is therefore a challenge that has 
not been previously faced that requires new methods and new ways of thinking. The safe 
operation of manned machines has ultimately always been the responsibility of the 
operators themselves, who have had to control the machine and monitor their 
environment in a manner that ensures no harm or hazards result from the operation of the 
machine. In worst-case hazardous situations, the operator could always act as a safety net 
of sorts if needed, stopping the machine before any harm could occur. However, 
autonomous machines do not have this advantage, and thus their safety must be ensured 
by other methods. The importance of these methods cannot be overstated, as in 
autonomous applications a small error in operation can lead to great consequences, for 
example, if an autonomous road vehicle encounters a fault in a densely populated area.  
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Autonomy is a relatively new field of research, which is why most research on machine 
and vehicle autonomy has centred on proof-of-concepts and on how these systems could 
be designed and implemented in practice. The safety of such machines has, however, 
generated far less research, but some previous research is available. Similarly, very few 
standards and other legislation on autonomous machines or on their safety are available. 
This has led to a situation where complex autonomous machines and vehicles are possible 
from a technical standpoint, but manufacturers and developers lack a common, 
comprehensive and effective way to ensure the safety of the machines. By their very 
nature, autonomous machines and vehicles operate in varyingly differing areas and 
around varying types of other machines, vehicles and people, which means they are faced 
with an essentially infinite number of different operational situations. Without proven 
methods for ensuring safety, it is a considerable challenge to make sure the autonomous 
machine or vehicle can operate safely in every operational situation. As the situations are, 
in theory, infinite in number, Murphy’s Law can be used to portray the scope of the 
problem: any error or fault in operation can lead to a safety incident given enough time, 
if no precautions are put in place.  
As current technology allows for fairly complex and sophisticated autonomous machines, 
manufacturers are faced with a paradox of sorts. Especially due to common methods not 
being available, ensuring safety of autonomous machines becomes a balancing act 
between an adequate level of safety, the level of autonomy and the functionalities the 
machine can offer. For example, it is relatively effortless to ensure the safety of a fully 
autonomous machine, if the functionality of the machine is simple and minimalistic. 
Similarly, it is relatively straightforward to create a fully autonomous machine with 
complex features, if it does not need to adhere to any safety requirements. 
When comparing autonomous civilian road vehicles and autonomous industrial machines, 
it is clear the former is the more researched and discussed field. This is largely because 
autonomous road vehicles attract far more interest, as they affect most of the general 
populous, rather than only a select field. Hence, there is more information available on 
autonomous road vehicles, such as standards, guidelines and ways of classifying levels 
of autonomy, than on the equivalent industrial machines. Therefore, many points made in 
this thesis are originally aimed solely for civilian autonomous vehicles (AV), but the 
knowledge gained from the research and development in this area will be a benefit for 
industrial fields, as the challenges and technical hurdles faced by both fields are very 
similar. 
This thesis is based on a thorough literature review on autonomous industrial machines 
and road vehicles with an emphasis on their safety. The goal of this thesis is to present 
and discuss the main aspects of autonomous machine and system design that affect overall 
machine safety. Furthermore, the main challenges of ensuring safety that arise from the 
increase in autonomy in machines and vehicles will also be discussed. The point of this 
thesis is not to present a specific practical method of ensuring safety for autonomous 
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machines, but rather to be an overview of autonomous safety and the challenges and 
hurdles that have to be overcome to create safe autonomous machines and vehicles.  
The thesis begins with general information on autonomous machines and vehicles, such 
as a definition on what constitutes as an autonomous machine. Importantly, the distinction 
between autonomy and automation is presented because these terms are often used 
interchangeably even though they imply notably different functionalities in machines and 
vehicles. Additionally in this chapter, an overview of the current standards and legislation 
that apply to autonomous industrial machines and civilian road vehicles is presented. This 
information is then used to present different categorisation methods for machines based 
on their autonomy. As no official categorisation methods exist that can be directly applied 
to industrial machines, a closer look is taken at the equivalent categorisations for 
autonomous road vehicles. Additionally, previous research is used to present alternative 
methods for categorising the levels of autonomy in industrial machines.  
In the next chapter, the main safety challenges that arise from the increase in autonomy 
are discussed. The first main challenge is to construct system architectures that are 
suitable for autonomous applications and also ensure effective performance and overall 
safety. The other main challenges include the position and movement planning 
characteristics of autonomous machines, which include such topics as localisation, 
motion planning and situational awareness. Next in the chapter, the risk analysis and 
verification challenges and methods of autonomous systems, which ensure the safe 
operation of machines in use, are presented. Lastly, the moral and ethical dilemmas of 
autonomy, which has been a widely debated topic in recent years as it is possible the 
actions of an autonomous machine or vehicle results in the death of a person, are 
discussed. This topic is presented from the viewpoint of road vehicles, as this has not 
been discussed in industrial applications.  
In the final main chapter, the mining industry is used as a practical example of 
autonomous machines in operation. The chapter begins with an overview of mining and 
mining operations. It is also discussed how mining can benefit from the increase in 
autonomy, as mining work tasks are often hazardous and repetitive and are thus well 
suited for autonomy. Next, the main challenges that are faced in increasing autonomy in 
mining applications, which stem mainly from the operational environments of mining, 
are presented. After this, the current developments in autonomous mining are discussed, 
with an emphasis on load-haul-dump mining machines, the autonomy and automation of 
which have been researched for over three decades. The last main topic in the chapter is 
the main safety challenges in autonomous mining, which are mainly the challenges in 
overcoming the harsh and hazardous operating environments.    
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2. AUTONOMOUS MACHINES IN GENERAL 
Autonomy has been a vision of the future for several decades. For instance, automotive 
manufacturers, such as General Motors, have shown interest in self-driving cars since the 
forties and fifties. In the last few decades, however, autonomy has evolved from a vision 
of the future to actual reality with offerings available in both industrial and civilian fields 
with varying degrees of autonomy. Completely self-driving cars and self-operated 
machines are still largely under research and development, but they too are not far in the 
future. 
This chapter begins with the definition of an autonomous machine and what is considered 
autonomy and what is not is discussed. Next, a brief overview is given of the current state 
of legislation and standards that apply to autonomous industrial machines and 
autonomous civilian vehicles. Lastly, as autonomy can be implemented in varying 
degrees, standards and other sources are used to present different ways to classify the 
level of autonomy of machines and vehicles from both automotive and industrial 
viewpoints. 
2.1 Definition of an autonomous machine 
Autonomy is often defined in a broader sense as meaning: “the ability to self-manage, to 
act or to govern without being controlled by others” (Baudin et al. 2007, p.5). In a more 
practical sense, an autonomous machine or system is an entity that is able to gather 
information on its surroundings and use this information to make decisions and perform 
actions in order to fulfil an ultimate goal given to it by an outside source. This outside 
source is usually an operator in industrial applications or a driver in autonomous road 
vehicles. Such goals given to an autonomous machine can be for example: “travel to this 
location” or “perform task A when criteria X is met”. 
The terms autonomy and automatic are often used interchangeably, as they are both 
similar in meaning and offer similar functions in machines. There is, however, a clear 
distinction between the two. An autonomous system has greater complexity and is 
capable of making decisions based on the information it has gathered, and then acts on 
those decisions. As the situations where autonomous machines make decisions vary, and 
no two situations are the same, there is no way to determine accurately how an 
autonomous system will act in a random and unknown situation in the future. Only broad 
assumptions can be made. On the contrary to autonomous systems, an automatic system’s 
behaviour can be determined beforehand, as it is always a predefined function or set of 
functions in regard to a specific input. (Baudin et al. 2007) For example, a simple cruise 
control feature could be classified as an automatic function: a set speed is given to the 
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cruise control module by the driver, and the system adjusts the speed of the vehicle to suit 
this value. Adaptive cruise control, however, is an autonomous feature because the 
vehicle makes decisions on whether to accelerate or brake in regard to the distance of the 
vehicle in front. Autonomy is not, however, a binary classification. Machines may have 
varying degrees of autonomy ranging from full autonomy to mere autonomous features. 
These levels of autonomy will be discussed later in chapter 2.3.  
Autonomous machines rarely operate in complete isolation, but rather operate around 
other machines and vehicles, both manned and unmanned, people and other dynamic 
objects. In the literature, these are often called agents. These are entities that act in the 
same area as the autonomous machine and have their own trajectories, goals and 
intentions that the autonomous machine must take into account. Another common term 
found in the literature is the state of an autonomous machine. Put simply, states are the 
sum of both internal and external variables of the autonomous machine in a specific 
situation, at a specific point in time. Thus, states range from normal safe operational states 
to states that can be abnormal and include some form of risk or hazard. 
2.2 Standards and legislation 
Autonomous machines and vehicles have enjoyed rapid technical advancements in recent 
years. This has led to numerous plausible applications where autonomy can be utilised.   
State regulatory establishments and standardising organisations have not, however, been 
able to keep up with these advancements in technology, which has led to a situation where 
numerous autonomous functions and features are technically plausible, but they lack a 
common method for development, verification and for ensuring safety, because of the 
lack of appropriate standards and legislation.  
Some previous standards are available that can be, at least in part, applied to autonomous 
industrial machines. These include standards relating to the safety integrity of machine 
control systems, such as IEC 61508: Functional Safety of 
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems and ISO 13849: 
Safety of machinery -- Safety-related parts of control systems. For civilian vehicles, there 
exists a similar standard - standard ISO 26262: Road vehicles – Functional safety. Some 
more specific and definitive standards for autonomous industrial machines are in the 
development phase and some, such as ISO 17757: Earth moving machinery and mining - 
autonomous and semi-autonomous system safety, have very recently been released.  
In the automotive field, the state of autonomous road vehicle legislation and regulation in 
general is still a work in progress. Some countries and states are in the stages of preparing 
and passing legislation on autonomous vehicles, but the work is still very much ongoing.  
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2.2.1 Standards on safety integrity levels 
Several standards are available for ensuring the safety of electrical control systems, and 
these standards can also be applied to autonomous machines to some degree. The two 
most prominent standards in this area are IEC 61508: Functional Safety of 
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related System and ISO 13849: 
Safety of machinery -- Safety-related parts of control systems. Furthermore, function- 
specific standards have been developed based on the aforementioned standards, such as 
ISO 26262: Road vehicles – Functional safety, which is specifically intended for road 
vehicles. 
A system is categorised as safety-related when it performs functions that keep safety- 
related risks at a tolerable level. Therefore, if these functions do not operate correctly and 
this corresponds to increased safety-related risks, the system is labelled as safety-related. 
(SFS IEC/TR  61508-0 2012) As such, autonomous machines can be categorised as 
safety-related as a whole because they have numerous systems that ensure the safety and 
correct operation of the machine. If the machine does not operate as intended, a definite 
safety risk is present. Thus, standards on safety integrity levels (SIL) can be applied to 
autonomous machines, at least in part. 
Functional safety is described in the standards as the correct operation of the safety-
related functions or parts of a system. In other words, if a safety-related control system 
performs functions that effectively negate the risks posed by the operation of the system, 
it is called functional safety. An example of this is an electric motor with a temperature 
sensor that monitors the temperature of the motor. If the sensor senses the motor is about 
to overheat, it will shut the motor off, thus reducing risk. Here, the system performs 
actions that correctly minimise safety-related risks, thus performing functional safety. 
The probability of functional safety, i.e., the probability of safety functions operating as 
they are intended to operate, is called safety integrity. In standards such as IEC 61508, 
safety integrities are separated into levels, with each level having its own maximum and 
minimum limits for the probabilities of failure of the safety-related function. (SFS 
IEC/TR  61508-0 2012) 
Standard IEC 61508 separates safety integrity levels of electrical, electronic, and 
programmable electronic safety-related systems into four levels ranging from SIL1 to 
SIL4, with SIL4 offering the highest level of safety integrity (SFS IEC/TR  61508-0 
2012). The implementation of the standard has three main goals: to determine the needed 
safety integrity level of the system, to guide the development process of the system and 
to verify that an adequate level of safety has been reached. In figure 1, it is demonstrated 
how this is incorporated into the development phase of a system. (Redmill 2000) 
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Figure 1. The role of SIL’s in the development process (Redmill 2000) 
The implementation of IEC 61508 and safety integrity levels can be seen as a funnel. The 
process begins with the risk assessments of the system, with the goal of determining the 
current risk level posed by the system. If these risks are deemed too great, a suitable risk 
reduction method is implemented, such as a safety function. The failure probability of the 
whole system, including the safety function, is then calculated, which corresponds to a 
specific SIL. If this SIL is too low, the safety function or the rest of the system can be 
altered to reach the desired SIL. After choosing a SIL, standard IEC 61508 supports and 
controls the development process of the system by offering guidelines and instructions 
on how a specific SIL can be achieved. Standard IEC 61508 is based on a life-cycle 
approach, which ensures the verification of the overall system safety and takes into 
account the whole life-cycle of the system. (Redmill 1998) 
The standard ISO 13849: Safety of machinery -- Safety-related Parts of Control Systems, 
is similar to IEC 61508, but it is a simplified version that is only applicable to machinery 
control systems. Instead of categorising probabilities into safety integrity levels, the 
standard uses Performance Levels. Additionally, the equivalent standard for automotive 
applications is ISO 26262: Road vehicles – Functional safety. The standard is a simplified 
version of IEC 61508 that takes into account aspects important to the automotive field. 
The standard also uses automotive safety integrity levels (ASIL) instead of traditional 
safety integrity layers. 
The main issue with applying the current standards on safety integrity levels to 
autonomous machines is that the standards often rely on human intervention in their 
hazard and risk analyses, which may not be possible in autonomous machines. As such, 
none of the aforementioned standards can be utilised fully in their current state. Therefore, 
new standards are needed, or the current standards must be updated for autonomous 
applications. (Behere et al. 2016, Kaznov et al. 2017) 
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2.2.2 Other standards for industrial autonomy 
To date, only a few standards for autonomous industrial machines have been released by 
the major standardising organisations. The formation of new committees and work on 
new standards are, however, currently ongoing.  
In mining, standard ISO 17757: Earth moving machinery and mining - autonomous and 
semi-autonomous system safety was released in late 2017 by the technical committee 
TC127, which is the committee in charge of earth moving machinery. The standard was 
a joint effort between TC127 and the committee on mining TC82. The standard outlines 
the safety requirements for autonomous and semi-autonomous machines used for earth 
moving in mining, such as load-haul-dump machines.  
The technical committee for mining, TC82, has not yet itself released any standards 
regarding machine autonomy. Negotiations are, however, ongoing to form a new 
subcommittee, SC8, for autonomous mining. This committee will, once formed, prepare 
new standards for autonomous mining applications. The current problem with forming 
the subcommittee is the scope and overlap with the previously mentioned standard ISO 
17757. (Kempson et al. 2017) 
Other developments in autonomous industrial machine standards include ISO 18497: 
Agricultural machinery and tractors -- Safety of highly automated agricultural machines, 
which is still under development (International Organization for Standardization 2018). 
No other information is available on this standard as of yet. 
2.2.3 The current state of autonomous road vehicle legislation 
Currently, the amount of state legislation in effect for autonomous vehicles is minimal 
both in Europe and in the US. The reason behind this is that legislation has not been able 
to keep up with the rapid advancements in autonomous technologies. Steps have been 
recently made, however, to pass legislation and standards for autonomous vehicles in the 
automotive field.  
In regard to autonomous road vehicles, the US has been the forerunner in passing 
legislation, as several US states have been implementing AV laws since 2011. US states 
could even be said to be in competition with each other in trying to be the leading state in 
the implementation of autonomous vehicles and laws, and thus being the forerunner in 
technological advancement. This is in part due to the push from companies such as 
Google who will benefit from being able to use autonomous vehicles on the roads as 
quickly as possible. Most of the legislation passed thus far has allowed the testing of 
autonomous vehicles on public roads, but few have allowed the actual civilian usage of 
AV’s. (Schreurs & Steuwer 2016) Continuing the trend set by US states, in the latter half 
of 2017 the US House of Representatives passed a bill entitled the “SELF DRIVE Act” 
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(2017). The aim of the bill is to create a nationwide framework for the regulation of AV’s. 
The bill, if passed into full legislation, would be the first federal legislation regarding 
AV’s in the US, and thus be a large step for AV legislation in the country. 
In Europe, the state of autonomous road vehicle legislation is not as advanced as in the 
US. On an EU level, autonomous vehicle legislation is almost non-existent, as of 2015. 
There is also little mention of autonomy in the “EU 2020” strategy – the EU agenda for 
growth in the coming decade. On a country level, the situation is similar, albeit for a few 
exceptions. Especially Sweden and Germany have passed legislations for AV’s, where, 
for example, Sweden has allowed the civilian testing of AV’s. (Schreurs & Steuwer 2016) 
The EU has, however, funded a vast number of research programs on autonomous 
technologies ranging from driver assistance systems to fully autonomous transport 
systems, thus showing a great interest in autonomy. These projects include the Eureka 
PROMETHEUS project (Programme for a European Traffic of Highest Efficiency and 
Unprecedented Safety), which ran from 1987 to 1995, and the ongoing SARTRE project 
(Safe Road Trains for the Environment), which aims to research vehicle platooning. 
(European Road Transport Research Advisory Council 2015) 
2.3 Classifications for autonomous machines 
Due to the varying degrees of autonomous functions and features in autonomous 
machines and vehicles, different classifications have been conceived to help with, for 
example, the applicability of standards and other legislation. In this chapter, some of these 
classifications for both road vehicles and industrial machines are discussed.  No common 
method for classifying autonomous industrial machines, however, currently exists, which 
is why a close look is taken at the equivalent road vehicle classifications, as these can be 
used as a guide or starting point for classifications for industrial machines.  
2.3.1 Road vehicles 
The two most notable classification methods for autonomous road vehicles are the SAE 
International standard SAE J3016: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to 
Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles (SAE International 2016), 
originally released in 2014, and the guideline Preliminary Statement of Policy 
Concerning Automated Vehicles issued by the US National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) (2013). The former separates autonomy into six levels and the 
latter into five.  
The SAE J3016 classification is a widely used categorisation method for autonomous 
road vehicles, and it has been taken advantage of in legislation, for example in the United 
States (The United States House of Representatives 2017). The classification separates 
AV’s into six different levels ranging from 0 (no autonomy) to 5 (full autonomy). These 
levels are presented in table 1 with a brief description of each level.  
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Table 1. SAE J3016 classifications for AV’s (adapted from SAE International 2016) 
SAE 
Level 
Name Description 
0 No Automation No autonomous features 
1 Driver Assistance Longitudinal or lateral motion autonomy 
2 Partial Automation Longitudinal and lateral motion autonomy 
3 Conditional Automation Full autonomy in certain situations, driver as a fallback 
4 High Automation Full autonomy in certain situations, system as a fallback 
5 Full Automation Full autonomy in all situations, system as a fallback 
 
Currently, vehicles with autonomous functions up to level 2, such as Tesla’s Auto Pilot, 
are commercially available. Level 3 autonomy is predicted to be available in early 2020, 
while levels 4 and 5 are estimated to be available in late 2020 (European Road Transport 
Research Advisory Council 2015). 
In the standard, a clear distinction between the different levels of autonomy is made. The 
base level, level 0, is a vehicle without any autonomous features, such as a vehicle 
manufactured in the previous decade. This level also includes modern vehicles with 
warning systems, such as lane departure warning systems, that do not affect control of the 
vehicle. (SAE International 2016) 
Next, The Driver Assistance and Partial Automation levels are the first two levels with 
actual autonomous features. The distinction between the two is that in Driver Assistance 
the autonomous system controls either the longitudinal or the lateral movement of the 
vehicle, but not both. In Partial Automation, on the other hand, the autonomous system 
controls both. In practice, longitudinal autonomy is often adaptive cruise control, where 
the system maintains a fixed distance to the vehicle in front. Lateral autonomy is lane-
keeping assist, where the system keeps the vehicle between lane markers. These 
autonomous functions are available only in certain situations, generally only when the 
system or driver deems them fit. The driver on these levels is in charge of monitoring the 
surroundings of the vehicle and acts as a fallback if needed, i.e., the driver takes back 
control if the autonomous system encounters an error, fault or a situation where it can no 
longer operate autonomously. (SAE International 2016)  
SAE J3016 makes a clear distinction between the previous levels and levels 3 to 5, which 
is signified by the thick line in the above table. While on levels 0 to 2, the driver performs 
most, or all, of the driving functions, described as dynamic driving tasks (DDT) in the 
standard. However, on levels 3 to 5, the autonomous system performs all of the DDT’s 
and monitors the surroundings of the vehicle, when the system is active. Thus, when the 
autonomous system is active, the driver releases all control to the autonomous system. 
11 
Therefore, the driver can even be removed completely, as on level 5. (SAE International 
2016) 
On level 3, the vehicle is able to perform fully autonomous behaviour in certain situations. 
These certain situations are described in the standard as Operational Design Domains 
(ODD), which are specific situations where the autonomous features are designed to 
function. Level 3 ODD’s and autonomous features could, for example, be self-parking in 
a parking lot or autopilot on a motorway. When the autonomous system is active, it has 
complete control of the vehicle, but the driver is still used as a fallback in case of faults 
or other problems the autonomous system may face, similarly to level 2. (SAE 
International 2016) 
The next level, High Automation, increases the role of the autonomous system. The 
functionality of the level is the same as level 3, but with the distinction that the driver 
does not need to be a fallback if the system faces problems. The fallback functionality is 
performed by the system itself. In such a scenario, the goal of the autonomous system is 
to achieve a minimal risk condition and keep the system in a safe state. As such, level 4 
allows for full autonomy in the scope of an ODD, where the driver can be completely 
passive and even sleep. (SAE International 2016) 
The last level, Full Automation, offers full autonomy of the vehicle in all situations, i.e., 
the ODD can be said to be infinite. Vehicles of this level perform all DDT’s and do not 
need the input of a driver and, as such, the driver does not need to be in the vehicle. (SAE 
International 2016) 
The other major categorisation method for AV’s is the guideline issued by the NHTSA. 
The categories are similar to the ones in standard SAE J3016, but in the NHTSA 
classification there are only five levels, from 0 (no autonomy or automation) to 5 (full 
autonomy), as opposed to six. These levels are presented in table 2 with a brief description 
of each.  
Of note is that the NHTSA guideline does not use the word “autonomous” in its 
categorisations. The term is only used once in the guideline to describe self-driving cars 
as autonomous. All other levels of autonomy are described as levels of automation. Thus, 
the categorisations may be misleading as there is no distinction where the threshold 
between automation and autonomy lies. While the NHTSA categorisation is discussed in 
this text, the terms automatic and autonomous will be used according to the definition in 
chapter 2.1. 
 
 
 
12 
Table 2. NHTSA classifications for AV’s 
NHTSA 
Level 
Name Description 
0 No Automation No autonomous or automatic features 
1 Function-specific 
Automation 
One or more autonomous or automatic functions, overall 
control with driver 
2 Combined Function 
Automation 
Autonomy of at least two primary control functions in certain 
situations, driver to take control on short notice if needed  
3 Limited Self-Driving 
Automation 
Full autonomy in certain situations, driver needed to 
occasionally take control  
4 Full Self-Driving 
Automation 
Full autonomy in all situations  
 
The base level, level 0, is similar to the equivalent SAE J3016 level. A vehicle of this 
level does not have any autonomous or automatic features. Additionally, if the vehicle 
has warning systems, such as forward collision warning or lane departure warning that 
do not offer additional control functions, the vehicle is also categorised as level 0. 
(National Highway Safety Administration 2013) 
The next level, Function-Specific Automation, offers one or more autonomous or 
automatic functions. These functions operate independently from each other and overall 
control of the vehicle remains with the driver. The driver is thus responsible for the overall 
operation of the vehicle and must perform all monitoring of the environment. Functions 
of level 1 are, for example, cruise control and automatic braking. (National Highway 
Safety Administration 2013) The SAE J3016 counterpart of this level would be level 1, 
Driver Assistance, but the two have clear differences. The NHTSA classification 
classifies vehicles with automatic functions, such as cruise control, as level 1, but 
according to SAE J3016, these would not count as autonomous and the vehicle would 
thus be level 0. However, if a vehicle has autonomy of one control function, the vehicle 
would be categorised as level 1 by both SAE J3016 and the NTHSA classification. 
Combined Function Automation is the third level in the NTHSA classification. On this 
level, the vehicle is equipped with autonomy of at least two primary control functions in 
certain situations. When in such a situation, active control of these functions is given to 
the autonomous system, but the driver is still tasked with monitoring the environment. 
The driver must also be available and ready to take control of the vehicle within short 
notice, if needed. Examples of such autonomous functionalities are adaptive cruise 
control and lane-keep assist. (National Highway Safety Administration 2013) Level 2 is 
similar to the SAE J3016 level 2, Partial Autonomy, where instead of two or more 
autonomous control functions, the vehicle has autonomous control of both longitudinal 
and lateral movement in certain situations. In both, however, the driver is in charge of 
monitoring the environment and must be ready to take control if needed. 
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Limited Self-Driving Automaton is the second to last level of autonomy in the NHTSA 
classification. Vehicles of this level are able to function autonomously in certain 
situations. In these situations, the autonomous system takes full control of the vehicle and 
monitors its surroundings. The driver is not needed for active control but must be able to 
take control if needed after a transition time. Such a need may arise, for example, if the 
AV enters a location where autonomous driving is no longer possible. (National Highway 
Safety Administration 2013) Limited Self-Driving Automation resembles SAE J3016 
level 3 Conditional Automation. In both, the vehicle operates autonomously in certain 
situations, or ODD’s. When the ODD is about to end, the driver is prompted to take 
control. The NHTSA guideline does not, however, state how the system should react if 
the driver does not act on this prompt. If the system is supposed to reach a safe state in 
this situation, level 3 of the NHTSA guideline is more in line with SAE J3016 level 4. If 
not, level 3 is more similar.  
The last level is titled Full Self-Driving Automation, which is the highest form of 
autonomy according to the guideline. In this level, the vehicle is able to operate 
completely autonomously, with the driver only needed to enter the destination location. 
(National Highway Safety Administration 2013) This level is thus similar to the SAE 
J3016 level 5 Full Automation.  
2.3.2 Industrial perspective 
As discussed in chapter 2.2., only a few standards on autonomous industrial machines 
have been released thus far. As such, none of the major standardising organisations offer 
a method to categorise industrial autonomous machines based on their levels of 
autonomy. This is, however, also likely due to the vast number of different applications 
for autonomy in industrial fields, whereas in the automotive domain these applications 
are quite similar. Because of the lack of a standardised way to categorise industrial 
autonomous machines, more pragmatic approaches are often used to categorise machines, 
for example, in mining applications. 
In mining, a pragmatic approach to categorising autonomous industrial machines is to 
categorise them by their control method. This categorisation includes both non-
autonomous and autonomous machines, as only the most sophisticated level of control is 
considered true autonomy. Machines are often categorised into six levels: manual 
operation, remote control, teleportation, blind autonomy, semi-autonomy and full 
autonomy (Brown 2012, Gustafson 2011).  
The base level, manual operation, is a traditional industrial machine that is controlled by 
an operator from inside or on top of the machine. An example of such a machine is a 
traditional mining haulage truck, which is controlled by an operator inside the cabin. The 
first step towards autonomy of such a machine, and thus the second level of 
categorisation, is remote control of the vehicle. With such a machine, the operator is 
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removed from the machine and the machine is controlled with a remote controller. 
Importantly, the operator still has a line of sight to the machine at all times and must 
therefore be situated close by. (Brown 2012, Gustafson 2011) 
The next logical step towards autonomy is teleoperation. The clear distinction to the 
previous level is that the operator no longer has to have a clear line of sight of the machine, 
but rather operates the vehicle remotely, traditionally via a video feed. (Brown 2012, 
Gustafson 2011) 
The next level, blind autonomy, offers the lowest form of autonomy. Machines of this 
level can navigate on fixed paths without an operator, but they are “blind”, i.e., they do 
not have any kind of situational awareness and cannot sense obstacles. (Brown 2012) For 
example, many mining haul machines used underground are considered blind.  
When a machine can operate fully autonomously in only some specific situations, or when 
it cannot carry out all of the stages of its work cycle independently without an operator, 
it is considered semi-autonomous. While operating in autonomous mode, these machines 
gather information on their surroundings and act on this information, similarly to fully 
autonomous machines. A human operator is, however, needed to ensure safe and correct 
operation, and to take control when needed. This is traditionally performed via 
teleoperation. (Gustafson 2011)  
Lastly, the final level is full autonomy, where the machine can operate autonomously at 
all times. The machine has a set goal it has to achieve; it then gathers information on its 
surroundings and makes decisions using this information to achieve the set goal. An 
operator is not needed for operation, but traditionally one is required to monitor the 
machine. (Brown 2012, Gustafson 2011)  
This is a rough categorisation, which does not include all aspects of autonomy, such as 
operator assisting systems, and it can be argued that a fixed path travelling blind machine 
does not count as autonomy at all. The categorisation is nonetheless a good indication of 
the steps taken from no autonomy to full autonomy in machines, such as mining haulage 
trucks or other vehicles, where the main function is not to transport people. More 
theoretical and general approaches for categorising autonomous machines are also 
available, as pragmatic approaches are usually specific for only certain applications. 
Behere and Liljeqvist argue in the article: Towards Autonomous Architectures: An 
Automotive Perspective (2012) that all autonomous systems can be separated into a 3+1 
pattern, which includes all aspects needed for autonomy. They also argue that the pattern 
can be used to categorise levels of autonomy. The pattern is presented in figure 2 and it 
includes four portions: User, Environment, Control and Self. 
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Figure 2. The 3+1 pattern (Behere & Liljeqvist 2012) 
At the centre of the pattern is the portion Self, which represents the internal decision-
making capabilities of the system, that is constantly in interaction with the other portions 
of the pattern. The Environment portion of the pattern is the situational awareness and 
world model building functions of the system that build a picture of where the machine 
is located and what is around it. The User portion contains the interactions with the user 
of the machine, which can be continuous, or a set of goals given to the machine. Lastly, 
the Control portion is in charge of controlling the actual machine. (Behere & Liljeqvist 
2012) 
The 3+1 pattern can be used to categorise the level of autonomy of systems by analysing 
the complexity of each part of the pattern. In a highly intelligent autonomous machine, 
all parts of the pattern are present and are highly complex. For example, an autonomous 
road vehicle utilises all parts of the pattern: Environment is used for localisation, 
situational awareness and motion planning, while User and Control are used to store the 
desired destination and to control the vehicle to reach this destination, respectively. Less 
complex autonomous systems would thus have less complex portions of the pattern. 
Moreover, if the functionalities that are represented by the portions of the pattern are 
missing completely, the system is not considered autonomous, but rather automatic. For 
example, a traditional cruise control system of a road vehicle does not have an 
Environment portion, as the system does not monitor the operational environment in any 
way. Therefore, a cruise control system cannot be regarded as autonomy based on the 3+1 
pattern, which is also the same conclusion based on the definition in chapter 2.1. (Behere 
& Liljeqvist 2012) 
A standardised method for categorising industrial autonomous machines, similar to the 
NHTSA guideline or standard SAE J3016, would be greatly beneficial for the 
development of further autonomous machine standards. Moreover, with a common 
methodology of categorising autonomous machines, adequate levels of safety would be 
relatively simple to verify because each level could have specific safety requirements. 
Lastly, as there is no common way to distinguish between the levels of autonomy in 
industrial machines, the autonomy and automation of a machine are often used as 
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interchangeable terms, and hence there is a lack of clarity on what the machine is actually 
capable of. 
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3. AUTONOMY SAFETY CHALLENGES 
Autonomous machines and vehicles are vastly complex and intelligent entities that often 
operate in highly unstructured environments that include a number of other agents, such 
as other autonomous machines, manned vehicles and people. This introduces a great 
number of new safety challenges that have not been an issue in the past, which 
autonomous machines must overcome. An autonomous machine must operate in these 
environments effectively and safely, without making errors in operation, that could lead 
to safety hazards. Errors that an autonomous machine could make include erroneous 
movement or actions, errors in decision making or systematic errors embedded in the 
system architecture of the machine itself. The basis of a safe autonomous machine is the 
definition of safety given in standard IEC 61508, which states safety is: “the freedom 
from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to the health of people, either 
directly, or indirectly as a result of damage to property or to the environment." (SFS 
IEC/TR 61508-0 2012). Autonomous machines include a vast number of safety functions 
and features, which are tasked with keeping the machine in a safe state. This is an 
important aspect of safety, but as discussed in chapter 2, an autonomous machine can be 
labelled as a safety-related system as a whole. because the correct operation of all of the 
machine’s subsystems is needed to ensure safety and not only the direct safety functions.  
In the following chapters, the different aspects of safe operation for industrial autonomous 
machines are discussed. Topics on the safety of autonomous civilian vehicles are also 
included, as these issues are more researched, and the challenges faced are often similar 
to autonomous industrial machines. A study on civilian vehicle autonomy is therefore 
beneficial because the advancements and findings in autonomous road vehicle 
technologies can be applied to industrial machines and are indicative of the future 
developments needed for industrial applications.   
The chapter begins with an overview on the nature of the hazards that autonomous 
machines face in operation. Then, the differences between the challenges faced by 
industrial and civilian machines and vehicles are discussed. The next part of the chapter 
deals with system architectures and how they affect overall machine safety, and what 
challenges are faced in designing architectures for autonomous machines. After this, the 
main areas that affect the safe operation of an autonomous machine, such as localisation, 
motion planning, situational awareness and risk analysis, are discussed. Additionally, the 
moral and ethical dilemmas that arise from autonomy from a road vehicle viewpoint are 
presented in depth. Lastly, the paradox that arises from ensuring the safety of an 
autonomous machine while also ensuring effective autonomy is discussed. 
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3.1 The nature of autonomous safety hazards 
Most hazards and risks related to autonomous machines arise from the complex nature of 
the machines and the varying operational environments where they are used. Most 
operational state combinations cannot therefore be known beforehand, which may lead to 
safety issues. The main safety risks posed by autonomous machines are due to both 
hazardous operation and faults that occurr in the decisional mechanisms of the machine. 
(Baudin et al. 2007) 
Hazards posed by the operation of an autonomous machine can be separated into 
endogenous and exogenous hazards. Endogenous hazards are caused by faults introduced 
in the machine itself, such as faults introduced in development or faults due to component 
failures. (Baudin et al. 2007) These faults may lead to incorrect operation of the machine, 
and may thus pose a safety risk. In the standard IEC 61508, which is discussed in chapter 
2.2.1, these types of faults are labelled as systematic and random faults and the standard 
outlines how these affect the functional safety of the system. Exogenous hazards, on the 
other hand, are caused by the operational environment of the machine, rather than by the 
machine itself. These hazards include faults due to outside interference and unforeseen 
events due to the environment. Exogenous hazards may also arise from the uncertainty of 
the environment due to missing environmental information. This may occur, for example, 
because of unsuitable sensors. (Baudin et al. 2007) 
Faults in the decisional mechanisms that autonomous machines may face are separated 
into internal faults and interface faults, both of which may pose safety risks. Internal faults 
of the decision making of the machine include situations where the machine makes 
decisions with incomplete information, resulting in erroneous operation. Internal faults 
may also arise if the machine is faced with having to make a decision in a situation that 
was not foreseen by the designer of the machine, and thus the machine cannot act in this 
situation correctly because it is unsuitable for this situation. Interface faults that decision-
making may face are faults due to errors in communication. These include ontological 
mismatches where one term has different meanings in different parts of the system, 
leading to errors. Interface faults also occur when human operators interpret information 
incorrectly, leading to undesired behaviour of the machine. (Baudin et al. 2007)  
Additionally, errors faced by an autonomous machine can also be separated into omission 
errors and commission errors, both of which may result from the faults described 
previously. Omission errors occur when the autonomous machine does not perform an 
expected function and the system must then perform a recovery action to keep the 
machine in a safe state. Commission errors are the opposite and occur when the machine 
performs an action or chain of actions that were not desired or were otherwise forbidden. 
Both scenarios may lead to safety hazards. (Baudin et al. 2007) 
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3.2 Civilian and industrial differences 
The safety challenges of autonomous industrial machines are similar to civilian road 
vehicles. Both types of machine may have to operate in complex environments with 
several interactions with other vehicles, autonomous and non-autonomous, as well as 
people. Both types of machine must also do this efficiently and, above all, safely. The 
challenges machines and vehicles face have, however, some notable differences.  
The number of civilian vehicles on the road, the frequency of their usage and the vast 
distances travelled create a far greater safety challenge than for the equivalent industrial 
machine which are far fewer in number. As autonomous machines can be considered 
safety-related systems, as discussed in chapter 2.2.1, the fault tolerance of a civilian AV 
must be considerably higher because the sum of operational hours is considerable. This 
leads to a need for a high safety integrity level, which may not be needed for the 
equivalent industrial autonomous machine, as the number of these machines in use is 
smaller. 
Interactions between other vehicles and people is far more common with civilian AV’s 
than industrial autonomous machines due to the sheer number of vehicles and people in 
civilian areas. Industrial applications are, on the other hand, far more secluded with less 
traffic, which lessens the challenge in ensuring safety.   
Industrial autonomous machines face their own set of problems that mainly stem from 
their operational environment. Areas where industrial machines operate are usually harsh 
with extreme temperatures, large amounts of dust and other disturbances, which affect 
the reliability of sensors and interfere with the correct operation of the autonomous 
machine. Areas where industrial machines operate are also often temporary and 
constantly evolving, which means pre-made maps that could be utilised in navigation, as 
with autonomous civilian vehicles, are not available. Industrial machines are also much 
larger than civilian AV’s, which increases the risk they pose. (Nebot 2007) 
3.3 System architectures 
The increase in machine autonomy has brought with it numerous new functionalities to 
existing machines. This has led to the need to evolve existing system architectures to 
accommodate these new features, which has, however, introduced numerous challenges, 
namely in constructing system architectures that are effective and safe. The addition of 
autonomy to a system architecture cannot be thought of as only a new feature, but rather 
a from-the-ground-up-approach is needed for safe and effective autonomous system 
architectures (Kaznov et al. 2017). Architectures that operate correctly are needed for 
autonomous applications because if an architecture does not allow for the correct 
operation of an autonomous machine, it may lead to safety hazards due to the nature of 
autonomous machines and their operational environment. There are, however, no 
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guidelines or standards on designing a system architecture for autonomous machines, so 
the challenges must be solved by the system designers alone (Kaznov et al. 2017). The 
architecture challenges are not only technical, but also include the development process 
and certification phases of system design (Behere et al. 2016). 
In the past, the most common type of system architectures used in vehicles and machines 
were federated architectures, where system parts are separated into self-contained 
electronic control units (ECU) connected to each other via a communication bus. Each 
unit has its own function that is controlled by the unit itself. (Behere et al. 2016, Kaznov 
et al. 2017) An example of a federated system from an aviation application is presented 
in figure 3 below. Here the system architecture is separated into three parts with their own 
central processing units (CPU), connected via a communication bus, with one part 
controlling sensors, the second effectors and the third the interactions with the user. 
  
Figure 3. An example of a federated system architecture (Watkins & Walter 2007) 
Federated architectures are easily expandable and verified due to their modular 
characteristics. However, as they are expanded, they begin to suffer from high 
complexity, resource consumption and cost. (Behere et al. 2016, Kaznov et al. 2017) 
The limitations of federated architectures has led to the adoption of integrated 
architectures in both the autonomous industrial and automotive fields. Integrated system 
architectures differ from federated architectures in that one ECU may control several 
different functions, or one function may be controlled by several ECU’s. (Behere et al. 
2016, Kaznov et al. 2017) An example of an integrated architecture is presented in figure 
4, again from an aviation application. In the example architecture, the system is controlled 
by a single CPU that controls the three functions that were also included in the 
architecture in figure 3. 
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Figure 4. An example of an integrated system architecture (Watkins & Walter 2007) 
Integrated architectures offer greater functionality, require less space for components and 
reduce cost. However, because the systems are no longer a group of self-contained 
functions, integrated architectures are considerably harder to verify and test to assure 
system behaviour in all scenarios. This leads to the need for new methods for the design 
and verification of integrated system architectures. (Behere et al. 2016, Kaznov et al. 
2017) 
Due to the complex nature of autonomous systems, federated architectures are not well 
suited for autonomous applications. An autonomous system requires considerable 
communication and functioning between parts of the system, which is why integrated 
architecture are a better option.  
3.3.1 Problem areas 
The incorporation of autonomy in integrated system architectures leads to four distinct 
problem areas in system design. These aspects also have a direct effect on overall machine 
safety because they affect the operation of the machine. (Behere et al. 2016) 
The first major challenge is the implementation and the usage of the world model in the 
system. The world model is a central part of any autonomous machine because it is in 
charge of the upkeep and distribution of what the autonomous machine believes is around 
it and where the machine believes it is located in regard to the world. World model 
information is needed by several of the autonomous machines subsystems and this leads 
to the problem of how this information should be gathered, stored and distributed on an 
architecture level. Traditionally, world data is gathered with sensors, such as radar, laser, 
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machine vision and the global positioning system (GPS), and this information is stored 
somewhere in the system architecture. The problem is that different subsystems may need 
this information in varying degrees and formats. Some may need a partial world model at 
specific moments in time, whereas some may need a complete model at all times. Some 
may require historical data on location or some may need more accurate data than other 
subsystems. The question is should all of the varying degrees of information be stored in 
a central complete world model, or should each subsystem gather and store the more 
specific data they require and share this data with other subsystems. The former could 
lead to size issues and questions on which subsystems are allowed to access and write 
which parts of the world information. The latter, on the other hand, may create needless 
complexity and have an effect on system efficiency. The challenge is to design the system 
in such a way that each subsystem receives the information it needs, in the desired format, 
without affecting the operation of the other subsystems. (Behere et al. 2016) 
The second main problem is human interaction. By design, an autonomous system must 
take some control away from the user as otherwise the purpose of autonomy would be 
defeated. The autonomous system should operate transparently, relaying all needed 
information to the user. There is however, no clear distinction on what this transparency 
should be in practice because no guidelines are available that indicate what information 
should be given to the user in autonomous operation. Furthermore, it is still a matter of 
debate what role autonomy should be given in machines in general and what functions 
should be left to the user. The two main opposite opinions are that autonomy should be 
left to functions that are not suitable for human operation, and the other, that autonomy 
should coexist with the user as an equal in control. The differing amounts of information 
given to the user and the differing degrees in autonomy may lead to situations where 
similar autonomous systems operate slightly differently to each other. This raises safety 
concerns when human users are involved. When a user switches from one similar machine 
to the next, undesired behaviour may occur due to the slight differences in how human 
interaction is designed in the autonomous system architecture, and in how the machine is 
intended to be used. (Behere et al. 2016) 
Autonomy unavoidably leads to more complex system architectures because it requires 
considerably more communication between subsystems than in traditional machines. This 
leads to a situation where the system must simultaneously act as a larger shared system 
and as isolated subsystems, which all may have different goals. Ultimately, the increase 
in complexity leads to increased difficulty in the testing, verification and validation of the 
system in the design phase. This may ultimately also lead to feature interaction, which is 
a situation where operation of one subsystem affects or counters the operation of another. 
This can lead to unanticipated behaviour of the system, affecting overall safety. An 
example of this type of behaviour could be a situation where two self-cancelling 
operations are performed at the same time, such as acceleration and braking. To eliminate 
this problem, the possible and probable feature interactions should be eliminated from the 
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system architecture in the design phase and by algorithms while in use. All possible 
combinations cannot, however, be known beforehand, and thus the autonomous system 
must have a means to solve these situations independently. (Behere et al. 2016) 
The fourth main problem autonomous system architectures face is the effect of autonomy 
on the systems extra-functional properties, such as redundancy, predictability and above 
all, safety. For example, most safety critical systems thus far have been designed in such 
a way that the last-resort failsafe has been for the user to take action by activating an 
emergency stop. With autonomous machines, this is no longer an option because there 
may not be a user to take control or the user may face the interaction problems mentioned 
previously. This means the robustness of the safety-related system must be increased, 
which is often done by adding redundancy to safety critical sensors, actuators and other 
components. This, however, leads to an increase in the cost of the system and the need 
for more space for these components. Therefore, other redundancy methods are needed 
for autonomous machines. (Behere et al. 2016) 
Another area where safety and other extra-functional properties are affected by increased 
autonomy is the predictability of the system. In general, safety critical systems have to be 
predictable and deterministic so that the way the system will operate in all situations  can 
be predetermined. With autonomous systems, however, this becomes a problem. 
Inherently by design, autonomous systems include some degree of intelligence and 
decision-making capabilities, which leads to operation where only a rough determination 
can be made on the future actions of an autonomous machine because every scenario the 
machine may face cannot be known beforehand. This complicates the verification of 
safety of the system because the machine will have to operate in varying environments 
and around other heterogeneous machines, where the number of distinct interactions is 
vast. Some unpredictability is therefore to be allowed for autonomous machines, but the 
question is how much. (Behere et al. 2016) 
3.3.2 Preventing hazards on an architecture level 
The main types of hazards that arise from the operation of autonomous machines were 
presented in chapter 3.1. These hazards stem from internal errors and faults caused by the 
autonomous system itself and the operational environment of the machine. Autonomous 
system architectures must have a method to correct these faults and errors to minimise 
the hazards that arise from operation of the machine.  
Exogenous hazards can be minimised by adding robustness to the autonomous system 
architecture. This can be facilitated by increasing the monitoring of the system and of the 
operational environment. Increased monitoring allows for greater knowledge of the state 
of the autonomous system, which alleviates the effect of outside interference. Robust 
monitoring also allows for greater sensing of the outside environment. This increases the 
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probabilistic evaluation of the environment, lessening uncertainties, which minimises 
unforeseen situations the autonomous machine may face. (Baudin et al. 2007) 
Endogenous hazards are also minimised by increased robustness, which is the main 
method of fault-tolerance of the system. The autonomous system architecture must be 
able to prevent the hazardous operation of the machine due to errors or faults and keep 
the system in a safe state at all times. This is carried out by both avoiding unsafe states 
and by bringing the system back to a safe state if needed. Increased monitoring is a benefit 
as it allows for the sensing of faults before they become an issue. (Baudin et al. 2007) 
3.3.3 Separate safety layers 
Another approach to construct system architectures, which ensure safety, is to implement 
a separate safety layer into the autonomous system. Several different approaches have 
been proposed on how a safety layer can be integrated, ranging from simple layers to full 
autonomous control units. 
Simple safety layers can be added to autonomous system architectures to ensure safety. 
These layers can monitor the machine and its surroundings and control safety functions 
when necessary. They often also include decision-making properties, which, for example, 
are used to allow or cancel certain functions. (Toben et al. 2012) Complete independent 
safety systems have also been proposed that have increased control of the overall system. 
Independent safety systems can monitor and observe the overall system and check each 
hazardous planned function and stop them if necessary, and thus keep the system from 
entering an unsafe state. The safety systems also monitor internal data and try to detect 
faults. The safety systems are independent from the rest of the control system, which leads 
to simpler verification, and thus a greater level of safety. (Baudin et al. 2007) 
Separate complete autonomous control units have also been proposed. These control units 
perform all autonomous operations and functions, as well as safety monitoring. In 
essence, an autonomous control unit would take the place of a human operator and would 
thus perform all control and monitoring functions without the need for the human operator 
to take control in any situation. A clear benefit of such a control unit is that many of the 
architecture problems discussed in the previous chapters could be avoided because the 
autonomous control unit would be separate from the rest of the system, and thus would 
only require certain inputs and outputs to operate. (Molina et al. 2017) 
In the paper by Molina et al. entitled: Assuring Fully Autonomous Vehicles Safety by 
Design: The Autonomous Vehicle Control (AVC) Module Strategy (2017), the proposed 
autonomous control unit is an autonomous vehicle control (AVC) module. The AVC 
module is separated into two parts: the autonomous vehicle operation (AVO) and the 
autonomous vehicle protection (AVP) submodules. The AVO submodule performs all 
functions needed for the operation of the machine, such as navigation and motion 
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planning. The AVP submodule in turn acts similarly to a safety layer; it monitors the state 
of the overall system and the environment and keeps the system in a safe state by, for 
example, deploying safety functions or cancelling hazardous actions. The AVP 
submodule also carries out internal fault and error detection. The AVC module thus 
carries out all functions that are needed for safe autonomous operation. The complete 
system diagram of an autonomous machine with an AVC module is presented in figure 
5. (Molina et al. 2017) 
 
Figure 5. Diagram of an autonomous system with an AVC module (Molina et al. 
2017) 
In practice, the AVO submodule uses its own sensing subsystem, and it uses this 
information to determine its current location and the current state of the environment. 
This information is then used to plan an adequate and safe trajectory for the machine, 
which is put into action by the control subsystem that directly controls the machine. The 
AVP submodule has a sensing subsystem that is separate to the AVO subsystem. This is 
used to monitor the machine and its environment and to keep the system in a safe state. 
As there are two sensing subsystems, a level of robustness is added to the system in case 
of faults. Both submodules can send orders to the machine’s main systems when needed 
to ensure safe and effective operation. (Molina et al. 2017) Molina et al. do not, however, 
mention whether the two submodules can control or communicate with each other directly 
and not only through the main machine system. This may lead to problems in highly 
intelligent autonomous machines, as it may be needlessly complex for the two subsystems 
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to only communicate through the machine’s own system. Unforeseen, unsafe operation 
or feature interactions may also result if both submodules control the machine system 
simultaneously. 
As the AVC module is separate from the rest of the vehicle’s systems, the module and its 
submodules can be tested and verified independently, which leads to ensured safety of 
the system. Moreover, because the modules are separate, in theory, they can be 
implemented into any existing autonomous machine system. (Molina et al. 2017) This 
offers greater flexibility in the design of autonomous systems and their architectures, as 
any means to reduce complexity and to minimise the challenges of verification are clear 
benefits.  
3.4 Localisation and motion planning 
Localisation and motion planning of an autonomous machine comprises determining the 
location of the autonomous machine in regard to the world and the planning of a suitable 
set of actions to perform the tasks given to the machine.  
Localisation of an autonomous machine is the act of determining the longitudinal and 
lateral position of the machine in regard to the world, and the direction it is facing. Several 
different methods have been used that include GPS navigation and vision and map-based 
methods.  
Motion planning of an autonomous machine can be separated into two distinct parts: route 
planning and trajectory planning. Both of these must be computed by the autonomous 
system when movement is desired. The aim of route planning is to create a plausible route 
from A to B for the autonomous machine to traverse. Trajectory planning, on the other 
hand, calculates the exact motions the machine must take to achieve the desired route 
calculated by the route planner or the desired action it must take. (Benenson et al. 2008) 
Route planning is a greater challenge in automotive autonomy, where distances and 
different route options are greater. However, both aspects of motion planning must be 
solved in both industrial and automotive applications.  
3.4.1 Localisation 
The correct localisation of an autonomous machine is an important aspect of safety. If the 
localisation of the machine is incorrect, all future actions and motions of the machine may 
be incorrect, which may lead to clear safety hazards. 
A wide variety of methods exist to determine the location of an autonomous machine in 
regard to the world. These include the usage of satellite positioning systems, which are 
generally used whenever a GPS signal is available, odometry-based methods, where 
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position is calculated from the movement of the machine, and vision odometry methods, 
where position is determined with visual references.  
Traditionally in outside applications, for example in autonomous road vehicles, GPS 
based localisation systems are the most common. In these methods, GPS signals are used 
to determine the current location and orientation of the machine. The reliability and 
accuracy of GPS is, however, not always adequate, which is why situational awareness 
and indoor positioning techniques are often used to enhance the accuracy of positioning. 
(Han 2008) 
Indoor localisation methods depend largely on the nature of the operating environments. 
In fixed areas that do not change over time, such as factories and warehouses, separate 
infrastructure can be used for the localisation and navigation of autonomous machines. 
These are traditionally beacons and other signals that the machine can follow to determine 
its location and to stay on route (Mäkelä & von Numers 2001). The problem with these 
systems is the cost and difficulty of constructing the needed infrastructure and the 
considerable effort needed to make alterations in later use.  
In evolving indoor environments, such as in underground mines, GPS signals are 
unavailable, and the usage of separate beacons or other infrastructure is not economically 
viable. In these environments, other methods of positioning are needed. These methods 
are most commonly dead reckoning or vision-based  odometry methods, or a combination 
of the two. (Mäkelä 2001; Faralli et al. 2016; Aldibaja et al. 2017).  
Dead reckoning is the practice of calculating a relative position of the machine in relation 
to a determined starting point via calculating movement. Wheel revolutions during 
movement of the machine are calculated, which is then used to determine the distance the 
machine has travelled from the starting point. A gyroscope, or other similar sensor, is 
used to determine the direction of travel and the sum of these two measurements is used 
to determine the location of the machine. The drawback of dead reckoning is that 
measurement error accumulates during movement, which may lead to a considerable 
position error if a long distance is travelled. Additionally, dead reckoning has to account 
for wheel slippage during movement, which can also affect positioning accuracy. 
(Gustafson 2011) 
Vision-based odometry methods utilise visual landmarks that the autonomous machine 
uses for navigation and localisation. These visual landmarks can be, for example, a 
topological map of the area or a scan of the wall profile in a tunnel. The autonomous 
machine is fitted with a camera or sensor that is able to detect these visual landmarks. 
While in motion, the machine scans its surroundings and determines its location in 
relation to the visual landmarks it has been given in advance. (Aldibaja et al. 2017, 
Gustafson 2011) The drawback with visual odometry methods is that the visual landmarks 
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must be determined in advance, and without them the machine cannot locate itself or 
navigate.  
3.4.2 Motion planning 
The safe motion of an autonomous machine comprises three aspects: the perception of 
the machine’s surroundings, trajectory planning, and the correct control of the machine. 
Perception of the surroundings of the machine is a combination of effective situational 
awareness and an adequate world model. When a suitable trajectory has been chosen, it 
must be put into action by controlling the machine accurately. If errors are made in 
actuation, it may lead to erroneous movement and hazards. (Benenson et al. 2008)  
To ensure a safe trajectory, three areas must be taken into account: the motion of the 
machine itself, the surrounding environment, and the infinite number of possible states 
or, in other words, the infinite nature of the time horizon. The first area is self-
explanatory; the autonomous system must choose a trajectory that does not directly lead 
to a collision. The second point acknowledges that a collision can also result from the 
actions of other agents, not only the machine itself. Lastly, it is important to consider that 
the time horizon of an autonomous machine and other agents is infinite because, given 
enough time, it is certain that a collision can happen. Therefore, inaction of the machine 
itself does not ensure safety because in an infinite time horizon a sequence of trajectories 
made by another agent will inevitably result in a collision. (Benenson et al. 2008) In other 
words, a similar way of thinking is to apply Murphy’s law to the state space of 
autonomous machines: any possible collision will happen, no matter how improbable, if 
enough time is given. 
Traditionally in robotics, the safety of planned trajectories of a robot’s movement has 
been ensured by the real time analysis of unavoidable collision states. An unavoidable 
collision state is a state of the robot where a collision is completely certain, irrespective 
of what actions the robot tries to make to remedy the situation. Thus, if a robot at all times 
ensures that it is not in an unavoidable collision state, no collisions will ever happen due 
the robot’s own actions. In practice, this means that safe trajectory planning is a chain of 
states where none is an unavoidable collision state. (Fraichard & Asama 2003, Benenson 
et al. 2008) This methodology has also been applied to the trajectory planning of 
autonomous machines, but it is not enough to ensure safety in autonomous applications 
because this approach takes only the machine itself into account and not the actions of 
outside agents, ultimately ignoring the infinite time horizon and the trajectories of other 
agents. (Benenson et al. 2008) 
An autonomous machine has only a limited comprehension of its surroundings, as there 
is a limit to what the on-board sensors can observe. Thus, some areas around the machine 
are not visible to the machine, as demonstrated in figure 6. The machine does not have 
any information on what is outside of the observed area: the unobserved area may include 
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other agents with their own trajectories, static hazards or nothing at all. The information 
the machine has on the observed area may also include uncertainties, as it is possible the 
on-board sensors of the machine have made errors or have not gathered correct 
information due to faults regarding interference. (Benenson et al. 2008) 
 
Figure 6. Observed and unobserved areas around a machine (Benenson et al. 2008) 
Due to the missing or uncertain information, the world model of the autonomous machine 
is always incomplete, which poses a challenge for trajectory planning. The world model 
must either be completed, or a trajectory must be planned with an incomplete world 
model. Building a complete world model that includes all agents and their trajectories is 
not practical. Therefore, a method to plan trajectories with an incomplete world model is 
needed. Moreover, an autonomous machine in a dynamic environment must make 
decisions quickly, as the environment is constantly evolving and inactivity can lead to 
safety incidents (Laugier et al. 2007). Several different methods on how an autonomous 
machine should navigate and make decisions in an incomplete world have been studied. 
These include the use of occupancy grids (Laugier et al. 2007), Markov models (Seward 
et al. 2007), maximum velocity profiles (Alami et al. 2007), and Temporal logic methods 
(Jha & Raman 2016), among others. One effective and often used method of navigation 
with an incomplete world model is the usage of partial motion planning (Benenson et al. 
2008, Laugier et al. 2007). First, a conservative estimation is made of the incomplete 
world model that can then be used in partial motion planning. (Benenson et al. 2008) 
The aim of partial motion planning is to create a safe trajectory in the observed area 
around the machine that takes the machine roughly towards its end goal, without 
necessarily reaching it. As the machine moves, it gathers new information on its 
surroundings and is able to plan a more accurate route towards its destination. (Benenson 
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et al. 2008, Laugier et al. 2007) To ensure these trajectories are safe, each step of the 
trajectory must be a collision-free state, that is not an inevitable collision state, and 
additionally, the final step must have a speed of zero. This does not mean the machine 
must continually stop after each trajectory, but rather the machine is able to continuously 
create new partial trajectories during movement, and if no suitable new partial trajectory 
is available, then the machine must be able to stop. This implies the machines entire 
trajectory is safe, and if the machine senses a hazard nearby, it will alter its speed so that 
it is able to stop at the end of its partial trajectory without a collision. (Benenson et al. 
2008) 
3.5 Situational awareness 
For modern autonomous machines, situational awareness is one of the key areas in 
ensuring safety. In the past, this was not such an issue, as most autonomous vehicles were 
blind and thus operated in separate areas where other vehicles and people could not enter. 
This is not the case for modern autonomous machines that have to operate around other 
machines and people, often in unstructured environments. Thus, the role of situational 
awareness in ensuring safety cannot be overstated. 
In practice, situational awareness of an autonomous machine is the knowledge of what is 
located and what is happening around the machine during operation at all times. This 
includes three aspects: observation of what is happening at the moment, assessment of 
how this affects operation and lastly, prediction on how the observed may change in the 
near future. This information is used to determine the level of safety of the machines 
current and future states. Thus, situational awareness is a method of risk assessment of 
the current and future states of the machine in regard to its surroundings. To determine 
the risks involved in a particular state, the autonomous system must analyse the 
information it has at its disposal. The two main areas to assess in the situational risk 
assessments of the machine are trust and completeness of information. (Wardziński 2006) 
Trust is an attribute given to outside agents that the autonomous system has perceived to 
be operating around it. The attribute indicates the amount of confidence, or trust, the 
autonomous system places on the agent that it will operate as expected and in accordance 
to set rules. For example, set rules govern the operation of road vehicles and they must 
be followed. Therefore, an autonomous road vehicle can place a fair amount of trust on 
normal road vehicles that are on an adjacent lane to the AV: the AV can be relatively 
confident the other vehicles will stay in their own lanes, and therefore the AV can travel 
without slowing down and without the risk of an accident. However, if a learner driver is 
observed to be in an adjacent lane, less trust will be placed on it because it is not as clear 
if the learner will follow all traffic rules. For example, it is possible the learner will veer 
into the AV’s lane without indicating, the probability of which the AV must account for. 
This leads to reduced speed and larger safety margins. Therefore, a low level of trust leads 
to a high assessment of risk, which in turn necessitates the need for risk reduction methods 
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in the current or future state of operation of the machine. Thus, if the environment is given 
a high amount of trust, the machine may perform to its full potential and with confidence 
that its actions will not create a safety hazard. But if trust is minimal, the autonomous 
machine may be unable to operate to its full potential or may be unable to operate at all. 
Therefore, trust has a direct effect on motion planning and overall safety of the machine. 
(Wardziński 2006) 
For effective situational awareness, the evaluation of the completeness of the information 
the machine has gathered on its surroundings is equally important as the evaluation of 
trust because all situational risk assessments are based on this information. The 
autonomous system must assess the completeness and validity of the gathered 
information to ensure the risk assessments made are correct because the information may 
be incomplete or non-valid for a number of reasons. Usually, these are due to technical 
limitations or faults that can cause missing or erroneous data on the machine’s 
surroundings. For example, weather conditions may have a great impact on visibility and 
thus on the ability of the machine to sense its surroundings. Missing information leads to 
an incomplete picture of the machine’s surroundings and operational state that will 
require safety precautions to prevent hazards similarly to situations of low trust. The 
completeness of information must be ensured, but of importance is also that the 
autonomous system must have a means to determine when information is missing or if 
the information is uncertain. If this is not the case, the autonomous system may act 
hazardously if it makes decisions based on incomplete knowledge. Alternatively, if the 
autonomous system knows the information on its surroundings is incomplete, it can make 
assumptions what this information could be and continue to operate safely. (Wardziński 
2006) 
An adequate level of trust in other agents and an adequate level of information on the 
surrounding environment are enough to ensure the safety of an operational state in the 
normal operation of an autonomous machine. Problems arise, however, when 
irregularities arise, such as sudden hazards. For example, an autonomous system may 
attribute a high level of trust on another agent with which it is in close operation, i.e., the 
autonomous system has assessed that the probability of this other agent continuing on the 
course it is currently on as high. But if this other agent notices a hazard on the outside of 
the autonomous system’s perception, the agent may have to alter its actions considerably, 
and the autonomous system has no way of knowing this. This may lead to a collision 
between the two or other similar incidents. If the area of perception of the autonomous 
system is too small, these situations are far more common. (Wardziński 2006) To 
circumvent the limitations of situational awareness and perception of a single autonomous 
machine, communication between agents could be increased. This would allow vehicles 
and machines to communicate to each other their current perception of the surroundings, 
dramatically increasing the range of perception. Sharing information would also increase 
trust between agents, as an agent could notify other agents on the actions it is going to 
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take. Different viewpoints on the same situation also reduce erroneous sensing and 
missing information, reducing hazardous actions made based on incomplete information. 
(Wardziński 2006, Benenson et al. 2008) 
3.6 Risk assessments 
There are two approaches on how risks that arise from the operation of autonomous 
machines can be assessed and mitigated: the predetermined risk assessment approach and 
the dynamic risk assessment approach. These methods are used both to minimise the risks 
posed by the machine itself and, to some extent, minimise the risks the machine may face 
in operation due to the environment. (Wardziński 2008) 
For simpler systems, a predetermined risk assessment approach can be used. In this static 
approach, the designers of the autonomous system conduct hazard analyses in the design 
phase of the system, where all possible hazardous states and sequences leading to 
accidents are determined and analysed. When the sequences of events that can lead to 
accidents are determined, barriers are designed to stop the autonomous system from 
entering these hazardous sequences. Barriers can be traditional physical barriers, or they 
can be software constraints based on sensors or location, or a constraint based on a need 
for a specific function before continuing, which all stop the machine from operating 
hazardously. The predetermined risk assessment approach is a linear method that can be 
visualised and analysed by an event tree analysis, as shown in figure 7. In the event tree, 
the autonomous system is faced with a potentially hazardous situation, where a hazardous 
event occurs. To minimise this hazard, the system deploys a barrier that may succeed or 
fail in mitigating the hazard of the event. If it succeeds, the system enters a safe state. If 
not, the hazard may increase, or an accident can occur unless another barrier is used. 
(Wardziński 2008) 
 
Figure 7. An example of an event tree analysis as a part of a predetermined risk 
assessment (Wardziński 2008) 
The predetermined risk assessment approach is a straightforward method for simple 
systems, such as blind autonomous machines, as it only recognises two states: a safe state 
and an unsafe state. If a machine is in a safe state, it is allowed to operate, but if it is faced 
with an unsafe state, a barrier is applied. An adequate level of safety is simple to verify 
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with this method because safety assurances are based on numerous separate cause-and-
effect measures that can be analysed and verified separately. For more complex 
autonomous machines that can make independent decisions and act on them, however,  
this method would not work because the number of potentially hazardous situations and 
events would be vast and to analyse all of them would require considerable effort. 
Moreover, ensuring safety by applying barriers that essentially limit the operation of the 
machine would hamper the autonomy and intelligence of the autonomous machine 
considerably. Hence, the dynamic risk assessment approach is needed. (Wardziński 2008) 
The dynamic risk assessment approach is suitable for more intelligent autonomous 
machines. Unlike the previous method, dynamic risk assessments are not carried out by 
the designers in the development phase, but rather continuously by the autonomous 
system itself in usage. The method is based on the notion that risks are not binary, as 
states can be safe, unsafe or anything in between. The autonomous machine may judge 
each situation independently and choose a suitable action based on internal dynamic risk 
assessments. This places a great emphasis on the situational awareness abilities of the 
system because they are needed to sense and determine the safety of the current and future 
states of the machine. (Wardziński 2008) 
Simple event tree diagrams cannot be used to visualise how risks are mitigated in dynamic 
risk assessment methods because there are no clear cause-and-effect relationships. Rather, 
the autonomous system can decide on which actions to take which can lead to a varying 
degree of either safer or more hazardous states. This is presented in figure 8, where the 
autonomous system is faced with two hazardous situations (SH1 and SH2). The 
autonomous system has several different possible actions it can take, which may lead to 
safe states (SS1 and SS2), or accidents (SA), or anything in between (SB1 and SB2). 
(Wardziński 2008)  
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Figure 8. Possible actions for a dynamic autonomous system in regard to risk 
(Wardziński 2008) 
The difficulty of the dynamic risk assessment approach is to design and verify such a 
system that can perform adequate risk assessments continuously in usage. This requires 
highly intelligent system architectures and situational awareness which, in turn, require 
precise sensing capabilities. To verify such a system is also challenging, as there is no 
common methodology or tools available.  (Wardziński 2008)  
A combination of the two previous approaches can also be used for the risk assessment 
of an autonomous machine. For example, it is possible to identify the main hazards the 
system can face as in the predetermined risk assessment approach. This information can 
then be used to compose specific safety rules for the autonomous system. These rules are 
a set of guidelines that can be applied to the internal decision making of the autonomous 
machine. These then ensure the autonomous system remains in a safe state, without 
breaking the safety rules and performing hazardous actions. (Baudin et al. 2007) 
3.7 System verification challenges 
Autonomous machines include various safety-related systems and functions, the correct 
error-free operation of which must be ensured for the safe operation of the machine. Many 
of the possible errors originate from the design of the system and the implementation of 
its functions, as discussed in chapters 3.1 and 3.3.2. Methods must be put in place to 
ensure an adequate level of safety for the machine, both in the design phase and when the 
machine is in use. These methods can be separated into offline and online techniques. 
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Offline techniques are used for the elimination of hazards that originate from the design 
phase, while online techniques minimise hazards that arise in operation. The challenge in 
verifying autonomous systems is that the state space of an autonomous machine is in 
essence limitless. In practice, this means not all state combinations can necessarily be 
verified, which creates a larger emphasis on online verification techniques. (Baudin et al. 
2007) 
During the development of the autonomous system, a model of the system can be created, 
which can then be checked and tested offline to ensure the system works correctly and 
dependably. Offline model checking is an automated method, where the model is given a 
set of behavioural properties and the full scope of different states are gone through. The 
model checker then goes through the different states in the state space, searching for 
contradictions in regard to the given properties, which include safety and liveness 
properties. The drawback of model checking is that it only offers an estimation of the 
final system in practice, as checking is conducted on a model of the system. Therefore, 
the method is not a comprehensive technique and other techniques must also be used. 
(Baudin et al. 2007) 
Testing is another method for the offline verification of an autonomous system. Unlike 
model checking, testing can be carried out on the system itself, or parts of it, rather than 
a model. The limitation of system testing is that because the state space of an autonomous 
system is in practice limitless, not all situations can be covered or covering all situations 
may require a considerable amount of time and effort. (Baudin et al. 2007) 
Offline verification techniques do not offer complete verification of an autonomous 
system, which is why online verification methods must also be utilised. Online techniques 
are tasked with eliminating hazards that occur in operation, including exogenous and 
endogenous hazards, and residual hazards that the offline techniques did not solve. 
(Baudin et al. 2007) 
Online verification techniques can be separated into fault-tolerance and robustness 
methods. Fault-tolerance methods are traditionally used to ensure the system remains 
operational even if it is faced by faults, which are usually endogenous hazards, while 
robustness methods ensure the system avoids faults due to exogenous hazards. Fault-
tolerance methods are usually based on adding redundancy to the autonomous system. 
These methods are used for error detection and for recovery of the system, which include 
error and fault handling. Robustness methods are separated on how they handle the 
erroneous states of the system and environment. These can be either implicit or explicit, 
where implicit handling applies the same methods to all states, and explicit handling only 
applies methods to specific sensed hazards. (Baudin et al. 2007) 
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3.8 Moral and ethical challenges 
The moral and ethical dilemmas presented by autonomous vehicles have been widely 
discussed in recent years, although mainly regarding road vehicles. The discussion has 
mainly centred around how the autonomous vehicle should act in accidents and other 
emergency situations, where a collision is unavoidable. The main question being should 
the AV faced with an unavoidable accident be programmed to choose a trajectory based 
on some predetermined criteria and if so, what should this criterion be. Even though the 
discussion has revolved around road vehicles, this dilemma also applies to industrial 
autonomous machines and is, as such, something to be considered by manufacturers. 
Although the moral and ethical dilemmas have been discussed widely, a uniformly 
accepted approach to programming some sort of moral code in AV's has not yet been 
agreed upon.  
The moral and ethical questions arise when the AV faces unavoidable accidents, and other 
hazardous emergency situations, that are not a part of its normal operation, and when 
deciding how it should react when faced with such situations. The classic example is an 
AV carrying a passenger that is about to be in an unavoidable fatal accident that includes 
other road users. This could be due to, for example, an unavoidable object in the way of 
the AV. In this example, another vehicle has blocked the road in front of the AV and the 
AV cannot stop in time to avoid a collision. The programming of the AV now has three 
choices: either manoeuvre to the left and hit person A, manoeuvre to the right and hit 
group B or finally, do nothing and hit the other vehicle, saving both person A and group 
B, but killing the passenger of the AV. This resembles the classic Trolley Problem thought 
experiment where a number of people are tied in front of a speeding train with one person 
controlling a lever that controls the train tracks. The person controlling the lever can either 
do nothing and have the train hit group A, or they can pull the lever and have the train 
alter its course and hit person B, thus saving more lives but ultimately directly causing 
the death of person B.  
Similarly to the trolley problem, the inherent problem in designing an AV is that the AV 
must be programmed to choose one of these options, i.e., someone has to program this 
behaviour of the AV beforehand. This burden falls on the manufacturer of the vehicle and 
the software designers working on the vehicle who must somehow decide which is the 
correct action for the AV to take in situations such as the previous example. This is no 
easy task as there are no obvious right answers. 
The root of the moral and ethical dilemma is that killing another person is almost 
uniformly illegal in all parts of the world. This is, however, exactly what has to be 
programmed in some fashion in the AV's code: in certain extreme situations killing a 
human being. As such, it is proposed that the answer to the moral dilemma should be 
based on the Doctrine of Necessity, which is a term recognized by the Anglo-American 
judicial system. According to the doctrine, in an emergency, extreme situation or extreme 
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conditions, if there is no other option, something illegal can be carried out, and it can be 
regarded as legal in this specific situation. This translates to AV's in situations similar to 
the Trolley Problem mentioned above, where the only option is to cause a person’s death. 
Therefore, this could be, from a legal standpoint, regarded as a non-illegal action. This 
does not, however, solve the original problem of choosing the right option in situations 
similar to the example given previously. (Santoni De Sio 2017) 
The first ethical problem is the question of blame and consequence. In law, intentionally 
killing an innocent is in almost all circumstances illegal, and the person responsible is 
prosecuted for the crime. However, the relationship of responsibility and prosecution is 
not as clear in situations where the AV has taken an action that has resulted in a person’s 
death. In essence, the AV has been programmed by the programmers to make decisions 
in some way in emergency situations, and to choose who or what to hit in a collision. It 
could thus be said that if an innocent life is lost due to the AV, this was ultimately due to 
the actions of the programmers of the AV. It can be argued, however, that the programmer 
is not to be held accountable because the programmer did not program the AV to kill a 
specific person, but rather programmed a wider range of guidelines for the AV for a wide 
range of different scenarios. Therefore, the manufacturer cannot be held accountable in 
most situations. (Santoni De Sio 2017) 
According to studies, most people would choose a utilitarian approach to the AV Trolley 
Problem: they would simply have the AV in all situations choose the option that results 
in the fewest number of casualties. This approach, however, leads to several ethical 
problems, one of which is the problem of incommensurability, i.e., the value of different 
people is impossible to determine by comparing them to each other, as the value of a 
person is completely subjective. This is the most significant problem with the utilitarian 
approach to the Doctrine of Necessity: there is no objective way to compare the value or 
worth of a person or persons, and thus it cannot be said that choosing the option with the 
fewest fatalities is somehow objectively the right decision. Moreover, material damage is 
excluded from this because it is not comparable to the loss of life, and an AV should 
always choose material damage rather than fatalities. (Santoni De Sio 2017) 
Further problems arise from the contractual obligations of the manufacturers of AV's. In 
law, it is stressed that manufacturers and service providers have a contractual obligation 
to keep their customers safe. Santoni De Sio uses a court case as an example of this in the 
article: Killing by Autonomous Vehicles and the Legal Doctrine of Necessity (2017), 
where sailors threw travelling customers off a ship to save the ship from sinking. The 
sailors where held accountable and prosecuted for this act because, according to the court, 
they should have sacrificed themselves because they had a contractual obligation to keep 
their customers safe. This is even though the utilitarian approach here would have been 
to sacrifice a few customers to save everyone else. This dilemma is also present in AV's, 
but it is also more complex. The manufacturers of AV's have a contractual obligation to 
keep to their customers’ passengers safe. However, unlike the sailors, AV manufacturers 
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cannot sacrifice themselves to save their passengers, but rather might have to sacrifice a 
third party in an accident, such as other road users, to uphold their contractual obligations 
if there is no other option. These parties are, however, entirely innocent in this situation 
and it would be morally questionable to have the AV choose to hit them. Thus, stating 
that choosing the AV to hit a non-customer rather than killing the passenger, due to a 
contractual obligation, is false. Therefore, it could be said that manufacturers also have 
an extra-contractual obligation to the third parties. This leads to the conclusion that 
contractual obligations are not enough to choose the appropriate behaviour of an AV in a 
fatal accident. To circumvent this, manufacturers could, in theory, sign a contract with 
the customers stating that in an extreme situation the AV might cause the death of the 
passenger. This is, however, something few people would willingly sign. (Santoni De Sio 
2017) 
Another aspect to consider in the programming of the AV is the responsibility held by 
road users. In many court cases throughout the years, great emphasis has been put on the 
responsibility of drivers of road vehicles, as it is seen they operate the means to harm 
another. This leads to the fact that even if a pedestrian or cyclist were in a fatal accident 
with a vehicle due solely to their own negligence, the driver of the vehicle would still be 
most likely prosecuted. A similar, or even greater, burden would fall on AV's and AV 
manufacturers as well. Because of this, AV's should always avoid hitting third parties, 
such as pedestrians and cyclists. However, in situations where the only options are to 
injure the passenger of the AV or to injure a third party, a clear contradiction can be seen 
with the earlier point, which states manufacturers have a contractual obligation to their 
customers. The responsibilities of road users are therefore not a suitable basis for the 
decision-making of AV’s either. (Santoni De Sio 2017) 
Lastly, it is a matter of debate whether decisions of this calibre, i.e., of life and death, are 
even suitable for the manufacturers of vehicles and the AV’s themselves. As such, a 
higher authority in the decision-making would be beneficial. Vehicle manufacturers 
could, for example, be either given a set of binding legal guidelines that the AV's must 
follow in the case of an accident, or in the future the decision-making could be centralised 
into a separate automated system that chooses the right outcome in each situation. 
(Santoni De Sio 2017) 
In summary, the moral and ethical dilemmas of AV decision-making are complex, but 
some guidelines can be drawn from the points mentioned above. Firstly, the AV should 
never choose to hit third parties, which are not part of the accident otherwise, and the AV 
should always choose material damage before human fatalities. Secondly, manufacturers 
have a contractual obligation to keep their customers safe, but this should not come at the 
expense of other road users. Lastly, the AV's should not target pedestrians or cyclists if 
there is an option to hit another vehicle, regardless of who is at fault. (Santoni De Sio 
2017) 
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The previous examples are mainly for road vehicles, but the same problems and 
challenges exist in industrial fields as well. Industrial autonomous machines must also 
operate around people and other manned vehicles, and thus may cause harm to these other 
agents with their own actions. Ultimately, industrial machines may also face their own 
Trolley Problems and, as such, the moral and ethical considerations of decision-making 
apply. 
The operational environments of industrial AV’s are, however, not as complex as with 
autonomous road vehicles. Interactions with humans and other non-autonomous vehicles 
are not as frequent as with road vehicles, and thus situations where trolley type decisions 
must be made are rarer. The speeds of industrial machines are also generally slower, 
which shortens stopping distances, leading to fewer unavoidable collisions. Lastly, a 
major benefit of industrial autonomous machines is that the goal of industrial autonomy 
is often to situate the operator into a control room or to eliminate their presence 
completely, thus reducing the risk of human fatalities and eliminating the contractual 
obligations of autonomous machine manufacturers and the moral dilemmas they bring. 
Nonetheless, the moral and ethical implications of the decision-making of autonomous 
industrial machines is something to consider and something that must be accounted for 
in the design of such machines, even though situations were these problems arise may be 
rarer than in equivalent road vehicles. 
3.9 Autonomy-safety-paradox 
The level of autonomy of a machine is a double-edged sword, as the increase of autonomy 
may affect the safety of the machine. This is called the autonomy-safety-paradox 
(Matsuzaki & Lindemann 2016), where the increase of autonomy may come at the 
expense of safety, and similarly the increase in safety may come at the expense of 
autonomy.  
In the past, autonomous machines were blind, as per the categorisation in chapter 2.3.2, 
and therefore operated in cordoned off areas where they followed predetermined routes 
with minimal interactions with other machines or people. This ensured an adequate level 
of safety for these machines. As technology has progressed, modern autonomous 
machines can sense their surroundings and do not need to operate in cordoned off areas 
or along predetermined paths. Therefore, the safety precautions set in place for blind 
autonomous machines will not suffice for modern autonomous machines, as they would 
interfere with the autonomous capabilities of the machine. A similar problem occurs if 
the risks of operation of a highly intelligent autonomous machine are mitigated based on 
predetermined risk assessments and barriers, as discussed in chapter 3.6. This is the 
essence of the autonomy-safety-paradox: an adequate and necessary level of safety must 
be achieved by the precautions put in place and by the design of the system, but they 
should not interfere with the autonomous operation of the machine considerably, as this 
would negate the purpose of the machine and its usage. (Matsuzaki & Lindemann 2016) 
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The autonomy-safety-paradox can also be thought of as a triple constraint for the design 
and implementation of the autonomous machine, as illustrated in figure 9.  An advanced 
and safe autonomous machine can be seen as a sum of three parts: the level of its 
autonomy, the complexity of the machine’s features and functions, and lastly, the 
machine’s overall safety. To create such an advanced machine requires considerable 
effort and high sophistication of all three parts of the constraint. For example, a highly 
advanced autonomous machine would require a high level of autonomy, highly advanced 
features and a high level of safety.  
Level of autonomy
Safety
Complexity of 
features and 
functions
An advanced 
autonomous 
machine
 
Figure 9. The triple constraint affecting autonomous machine design 
If any of the three constraints need to be changed in the design phase of the machine, it 
also necessitates changes in the two other constraints. Therefore, if, for example, the level 
of autonomy is increased in a machine, safety must be ensured for this new level of 
autonomy, and similarly, the features of the machine must be updated to take advantage 
of the higher level of autonomy. 
Considerably less effort is needed in the design phase of the machine if only two of the 
three constraints need to be considered. For example, it is relatively simple to create a 
machine that offers highly complex and advanced functions with a high level of machine 
safety, but with no included autonomy. Similarly, a machine with a high level of safety 
and high level of autonomy is simple to design if the actual features of the machine are 
minimal and simple.   
To create a framework to ensure the safety of an autonomous machine, binding legislation 
and standards are needed, as discussed in other chapters. This would allow manufacturers 
to create machines that have highly autonomous functionalities but still offer an adequate 
level of safety, as the machine would conform with the given standards and legislation, 
thus eliminating most problems brought on by the autonomy-safety-paradox (Matsuzaki 
& Lindemann 2016). 
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4. AUTONOMOUS INDUSTRIAL MACHINES IN 
PRACTICE: MINING 
Mining is a field of industry that can benefit greatly from the implementation and increase 
in autonomy. This is due to the hazardous operating environments, monotonous tasks and 
the scale of operations affiliated with mining. This is why in this thesis, mining is chosen 
as a suitable example for industrial autonomy in practice.  
In this chapter, the nature of mining is presented and the main benefits of increasing 
autonomy are discussed. Next, the main challenges autonomy can face in mining 
operations are presented, which often also affect operational safety. The current 
developments in mining autonomy are also presented, with an emphasis on Load-Haul-
Dump (LHD) machines, the autonomy of which has been researched extensively in the 
last few decades. After this, the main safety issues autonomy brings to mining are 
discussed. Lastly, brief examples on autonomous machines from other fields of industry 
are given. 
4.1 Mining and the benefits of higher autonomy 
Mining is generally separated into two different categories: surface mining and 
underground mining. As the names imply, surface mining is mining above ground where 
ore deposits are accessed by removing the top layers of soil and rock. In underground 
mining, on the other hand, the ore deposits are accessed by digging underground tunnels. 
Both are quite similar in operation, but differ in some key areas, and these differences 
also effect autonomous operations to some degree. 
Regardless of which type of mining is in question, the lifecycle of a mine is generally the 
same for both. A traditional life cycle of a mine is separated into five distinct phases: 
prospecting, exploration, development, exploitation and reclamation. In the first two 
phases, the location for the mine is determined by searching for and verifying ore bodies. 
In the development phase, the needed infrastructure for the mining operations which 
includes roads, access tunnels and so forth, is built. Next, the actual mining is conducted 
in the exploitation phase, where the desired ore bodies are extracted from the earth. Lastly, 
when the ore has been fully exploited, the reclamation phase begins where the mine is 
closed, and the environmental impact is minimised by restoring vegetation and water 
supplies. 
In underground mining, several different machines are needed, each of which is used to 
achieve the common goal of extracting ore deposits from the ground. The machines range 
from tools for drilling, to tools for shaping tunnels to tools for transporting rock matter. 
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The most common underground mining method is drilling and blasting, where drill rigs 
are used to drill deep holes in the rock face. Explosives are then placed in to these holes 
and detonated. The created rock matter is then hauled from the tunnel with dedicated LHD 
machines and dump trucks. Other methods and tools used for underground mining are, 
for example, raise borers, cutting machines, among others. (Heiniö 1999) 
In surface mining, drilling and blasting is also one of the most common mining practices. 
Here, similarly to underground mining, drill rigs are used to drill holes for explosives, 
which are detonated. Then, the rock matter is loaded into dedicated haulers that transport 
the material, for example, to be crushed by dedicated rock crushers. (Heiniö 1999) 
Mining has been in the past a highly hazardous form of industry, with numerous lost time 
injuries and fatalities happening each year. This is due in part to the hazardous areas 
where mining takes place, but also due to the high-risk work methods used in mining. 
Risks in mining include falling rock, other vehicles and machines, poor visibility and the 
environment itself. In recent years, great effort has been put on mine safety, which in turn 
has decreased fatalities and injuries greatly. However, mining is still regarded as a high-
risk industry in regard to safety. For example, there were 72 fatalities in US mines in 2004 
(Dhillon 2010), and in the same year 6300 people were killed in mines in China alone 
(Kumar 2010). 
Previously, the philosophy in mining was that to increase the amount of ore mined, 
mining companies would merely deploy more and/or larger machinery to achieve the 
demand for ore. This expansion unfortunately often came at the expense of safety. More 
recently, productivity and effectiveness with an emphasis on safety has become the 
driving force in mining, with mining companies monitoring these areas closely. This has 
created a need for smarter, more effective mining methods, and thus autonomy. (Marshall 
et al. 2016) 
The safety and productivity of mining can benefit greatly from the increase in autonomy. 
This is mainly due to the hazards involved and the somewhat repetitive work tasks 
associated with mining, which can be carried out without an operator with autonomous 
machines. Mines are also generally located in isolated places with mining companies 
having simultaneous operations in different countries and continents. Thus, the relocation 
of personnel is a significant expenditure for mining companies, and therefore the increase 
in autonomy can reduce cost considerably (Nebot 2007). On a closer level, haulage is an 
area where both surface and underground mining can gain benefits from the increase in 
autonomy. In surface mining, for example, haulage accounts for 40% to 50% of 
operational costs, and haulage vehicles are in many instances a part of mine accidents 
(Nebot 2007). In addition to the safety and productivity gains, haulage tasks are often 
repetitive, and can therefore receive great benefits from the increase of autonomy 
(Marshall et al. 2016). Lastly, mining companies have suffered labour shortages in recent 
years, which is due to the shifting attitudes of the current generation of workers in regard 
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to physical work. Modern workers are more accustomed to technology than hard labour, 
and thus both parties would benefit from the increase in autonomy. (Marshall et al. 2016) 
4.2 Autonomy challenges in mining 
The challenges of autonomy in mining are very similar to the challenges faced by other 
fields of industry, but the hazardous environments of mining add an additional challenge. 
For example, as stated previously, haulage accounts for a great portion of the operational 
expenses in mining, hence the interest in autonomous haulage vehicles. These vehicles 
suffer from the same situational awareness and localisation problems as other 
autonomous vehicles, but the operational environment adds to these problems 
considerably.  
Mining operations and environments differ greatly between surface and underground 
applications, which is why different types of autonomy are called for and different 
technologies are needed. For example, in underground applications machines navigate in 
underground tunnels where GPS signals are not available, and other methods of 
localisation must be used, whereas in surface mining GPS signals are available, but the 
operational environment is far less structured than the equivalent underground tunnels.  
In the article: Surface Mining: Main Research Issues for Autonomous Operations, 
Eduardo M. Nebot (2007) outlines the main issues surrounding the development of 
autonomous surface mining machines, some of which also apply to underground mining. 
Some of the issues brought up in the article have already been overcome, or the proposed 
solutions have already been implemented due to advancements in present-day 
technology. Nonetheless, the issues brought up in the article still have a great effect on 
autonomous mining, even if the issues have been solved.  
The main issue with the operational environment in mining is the unstructured and 
unpredictable nature of mines. The layouts of mines are constantly evolving, and many 
structures and roads may be temporary. As such, predetermined maps and layouts are not 
readily available, so they cannot be utilised in the localisation and route planning of 
autonomous machines as effectively as with autonomous road vehicles. Thus, 
autonomous machines in mining rely heavily on sensory data and other means of 
positioning. (Nebot 2007) 
The constantly evolving and changing nature of mines also means setting up separate 
fixed infrastructure for autonomous vehicles, such as beacons for guidance, is often not 
economically viable (Marshall et al. 2016). On-board sensors for localisation and 
situational awareness are thus a better option but have their own issues. The rugged 
operational environment of mines can have a negative effect on the performance of 
sensors due to extreme heat, vast amounts of dust and other factors This degrades the 
quality of the data acquired by sensors and can thus have a great impact on machine 
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safety, if the autonomous machine performs tasks with missing or incomplete data. The 
rugged environment also has an effect on the overall health of the vehicle, which may 
deteriorate at a greater pace than in other industries. This is something the autonomous 
system must be able to monitor, as maintaining an operational state is important for the 
overall effectiveness of the machine, as well as for safety. This may, however, be 
challenging to implement in practice if there is no human operator present because this 
would require system-wide integration. A human operator, for example, is able notice, 
without issue, a strange sound coming from the vehicle, indicating a fault. Implementing 
such a feature as part of the autonomous machine is, however, an entirely different matter. 
Similarly, the harshness of the environment affects the state of the roads in addition to the 
state of the machine. For example, a haul route deemed safe and traversable the previous 
day may have degraded to such a degree that it cannot be used any longer. Therefore, an 
operator of a haulage machine must continuously monitor and asses the condition of haul 
roads and determine whether a particular route can be taken. Again, effectively 
implementing such a feature in a fully autonomous machine may be challenging to 
achieve in practice because this would require highly accurate sensing and decision 
making. (Nebot 2007) 
Mining applications also require a vast number of interactions with manned machines and 
other vehicles. These situations are, for example, the loading and dumping phases of a 
haul vehicle’s work cycle. Interactions between autonomous machines and non-
autonomous machines are difficult and potentially hazardous to perform because they 
require precise situational awareness and control of the machine, and any errors in either 
may lead to safety incidents. This is why all of the machines in a mine must be monitored 
and controlled effectively to ensure an adequate level of safety and efficiency. Such 
systems are already in place in numerous mines, which will be discussed later in chapter 
4.3.4. (Nebot 2007) 
4.3 Current developments in autonomous mining 
Mines of the past have evolved from places with inferior occupational hygiene, and 
numerous safety hazards and high risks to highly monitored and efficient production 
systems that utilise a number of state-of-the-art technologies. A key area of interest in 
mining is autonomy, which is being implemented in all aspects of mining, with often the 
end vision of a completely autonomous mine. Mining automation and autonomy has been 
studied comprehensively in the last few decades, with most of the effort having gone into 
the automation of mining haulage vehicles, especially underground LHD machines. To 
facilitate autonomous mining operations, a mine must be closely monitored to ensure 
different parts of the operation work together effectively and safely. This has led to the 
usage of mine-wide monitoring and control systems that have turned modern mines into 
complex systems-of-systems. 
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4.3.1  Autonomous underground haulage 
Autonomous mining haulage machines are the most researched aspect of mining 
autonomy, with several being available commercially for both surface and underground 
applications. The most studied application has been the automation of underground LHD 
machines, the first simulations of which were conducted in the 1980’s and the first 
prototypes were in operation in 1999 (Gustafson 2011). Currently, semi-autonomous 
LHD machines are commercially widely available. 
A mining LHD machine is a machine used in the loading and transportation of rock matter 
in underground mining. A typical LHD machine is presented in figure 10. Traditionally, 
the machines are used after the blasting of the tunnel face to load the created rock matter 
and to transport it to a location where it can be loaded onto a haulage truck.  
Autonomous underground haulage trucks have also been researched extensively in the 
last few decades (Gustafson 2011), which has led to manufacturers recently offering these 
machines commercially. The trucks are used to transport rock matter from the LHD 
machines dump location to the outside of the mine. Therefore, their operating 
environment and the challenges faced are similar to underground LHD machines, which 
is why these machines will not be discussed in more detail in this thesis.  
 
Figure 10.  A typical LHD machine (Sandvik 2018a) 
Traditionally, LHD machines are centre-articulated vehicles that utilise either diesel or 
electric power. They weigh between 20 and 75 tonnes and are 8 to 15 meters long. Normal 
operational speeds for LHD machines are roughly 20 km/h to 30 km/h. (Gustafson 2011) 
A normal work-cycle of a LHD machine consists of first loading the rock matter formed 
from blasting with the bucket on the front of the machine. After loading, the machine 
transports the rock matter through mining tunnels to a specified location, where the matter 
is loaded onto a haulage truck, which is also called the dump phase. This interaction 
between machines is seen in figure 11.  
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Figure 11. Machine interaction between a LHD machine and an underground 
haul truck (Sandvik 2018b) 
Current LHD machines can be operated with a traditional human operator, via 
teleoperation, or semi-autonomously, but not fully autonomously. The haul and dump 
phases of the LHD machine’s work cycle are fully autonomous, but the loading phase 
must be carried out by an operator manually or via teleoperation. This is due to the 
difficulty of automating the loading of rock matter, as the intricate differences in the 
densities and forms of rock necessitates the precise and skilled control of the bucket, 
which has not been able to be performed sufficiently using automation. Research and 
development has been carried out to automate this phase of the work cycle, but this 
functionality has not yet been able to be incorporated in commercial machines (Gustafson 
2011). 
The autonomy of LHD machines is mostly based on the safe and effective navigation of 
the machine. Traditionally, two types of navigation methods have been implemented in 
autonomous LHD machines: absolute navigation and reactive navigation. The former is 
a method where machines are blind to their surroundings and navigate along fixed paths 
to the desired destination that has been determined beforehand. Absolute navigation is 
thus a method for automatic navigation, rather than autonomous navigation, as the 
machine does not gather any information on its surroundings. The more modern reactive 
navigation methods, on the other hand, are based on the machine gathering information 
on its location and making decisions on navigation based on this information. As such, a 
predefined route is not needed. For example, the machine can sense its surroundings by 
analysing the tunnel face around the machine and then use this for positioning and 
navigation. (Gustafson 2011) 
As GPS signals are not traditionally available underground, other methods for positioning 
and localisation must be used. Manufacturers have taken different approaches to solve 
this problem. The applied methods, however, are all based on scanning the machines 
surroundings for information that can be used to determine the position of the machine. 
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In addition, movement-tracking methods, such as dead reckoning, are also used. 
(Gustafson 2011) These visual and movement-based methods were discussed in more 
detail in chapter 3.4.1.  
For example, the Sandvik AutoMine autonomous navigation system is based on absolute 
navigation, and it utilises both visual odometry and dead reckoning. In practice, the 
system works by first manually teaching the machine a suitable reference trajectory by 
traversing the tunnels of the mine and simultaneously calculating the machines position 
by dead reckoning and by scanning the distance from the machine to the tunnel walls. 
After this, the machine can traverse independently by determining its location by dead 
reckoning and by comparing its location to the information gathered in the teaching phase. 
The benefit of this method is that no separate infrastructure or premade maps of the mine 
are needed for the navigation of the machine because the teaching-phase gathers all 
needed information for navigation. (Gustafson 2011, Mäkelä 2001)  
Other similar methods of navigation have also been researched. For example, a similar 
method to the previous AutoMine system has been proposed by other parties. In this 
method, the machine is similarly taught by traversing the mining tunnels manually, while 
data are gathered with lasers and by articulation and speed sensors. The data are then used 
to create a metric map of the mine and a suitable route profile. In autonomous mode, the 
machine uses this route profile and metric map to navigate by ensuring with the on-board 
sensors that the machine stays on the desired route. (Marshall et al. 2008) Other methods 
for navigation include the usage of premade maps together with sensor information 
(Larsson et al. 2006) and vision-based methods that recognise mine intersections and 
other visual clues (Gustafson 2011).  
4.3.2 Safety of autonomous haulage machines and standard 
ISO 17757 
To ensure the safety of haulage machines, especially LHD machines, the standard ISO 
17757: “Earth-moving Machinery and Mining – Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous 
Machine System Safety” has recently been released. The standard outlines the general 
requirements and main risks for all aspects of an autonomous haulage machine that 
manufacturers of the machines must adhere to in the future. (ISO 17757:2017) 
The general safety requirements for an autonomous underground haulage machine are for 
the machine itself to comply with ISO 12100 (Safety of machinery -- General principles 
for design -- Risk assessment and risk reduction), while the control system must comply 
with IEC 61508 or a similar other functional safety standard, which were discussed in 
chapter 2.2.1. More specific requirements are given in the standard for the main aspects 
of the machine system that include positioning and orientation, digital terrain maps, 
perception and task planning. (ISO 17757:2017) 
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In chapter 3, some of the main safety challenges for autonomous machines and vehicles 
were presented. These included localisation, motion planning and situational awareness. 
These aspects are also included in standard ISO 17757 that outlines the main requirements 
and risks associated with each aspect. Even though it was stated in previous chapters that 
system architectures are an important aspect of autonomous machine safety, they are not 
directly dealt with in the standard. 
In the standard, localisation is classified as positioning and orientation (POSE). The 
POSE system is in charge of the calculation and monitoring of the machines position and 
orientation in regard to the world. The standard outlines the main possible failures 
associated with the POSE system that include inaccurate determinations of position or 
orientation, or the complete lack thereof, which can lead to collisions with the 
environment or other machines. The standard requires that the autonomous system must 
be able to sense the aforementioned faults and that the system must remain in a safe state 
even if faced with such faults. The standard also requires a certain amount of robustness 
in the POSE system because the machine must be able to determine its position and 
orientation even if one part of the POSE system encounters a fault. (ISO 17757:2017) 
The aspects of motion planning are discussed in the standard under chapters on navigation 
systems and task planning. The navigation system of the autonomous haulage machine 
ensures the machine navigates effectively and safely to the desired location, while the 
task planner plans the actions that are needed to reach this location, based on internal risk 
assessments, and then puts them into action. The main risks associated with the navigation 
system are possible collision with the environment or other machines, which can result 
from erroneous POSE information or insufficient control of navigation. To minimise 
these risks, the navigation system must be able to notice if it no longer has a safe heading 
or velocity and remain in a safe state in these situations. Risks associated with the task 
planner, in turn, are hazardous tasks that may lead to damage or injury if they are put into 
action. For example, an erroneous task may lead the machine directly onto a hazardous 
route, or the route taken may lead to hazards for others. To minimise these risks, the task 
planner must be able to detect and avoid hazardous actions before they are put into action. 
(ISO 17757:2017) 
Lastly, situational awareness is discussed in the standard under digital terrain maps and 
perception. Some machines may utilise a digital terrain map which is used for both 
situational awareness, task planning and navigation. Operational risks arise if the map is 
inaccurate or otherwise erroneous. Therefore, the POSE system must be monitored 
closely when the map is created, or the area surveyed, to minimise errors. Perception, as 
described in the standard, is similar to situational awareness as discussed in chapter 3.5. 
A perception system is used to detect what is around the machine at all times and to gather 
relevant information for navigating without an operator. Possible risks and failures 
perception systems can face include the failure to detect an object completely or the 
failure to detect the object in time. Other errors in detection include erroneous locations, 
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misclassifications and false-alarms. Ultimately, the main goal of the perception system is 
to keep the machine in a safe state at all times. Therefore, if the system is not operating 
correctly, the operator must be notified, and the machine to be kept in a safe state even if 
detection errors are encountered. (ISO 17757:2017) 
4.3.3 Other autonomous mining machines 
Other areas of mining have also made advancements in the adoption of autonomy. These 
vary from autonomous haulage vehicles to drills with autonomous functions. Many of 
which have come to fruition due to the advancements made in underground haulage 
autonomy. 
Another highly researched and commercially available area of mining autonomy is 
surface mining haul trucks that have followed in the footsteps of underground haulage 
machines. An example of such a machine is presented in figure 12. In general, surface 
haulage machines are similar to their underground counterparts, but differ mainly in size 
and operational environment. Surface trucks are also tasked with moving rock matter 
around the mine site, but usually the distances are considerably longer than in 
underground applications. Surface haul trucks are also generally far larger, as their 
carrying capacity is usually several hundred tonnes. 
 
Figure 12. An autonomous surface mining haul truck (Caterpillar 2018) 
Surface haul trucks offer varying degrees of autonomy, from mere driver assist systems, 
such as collision-alert and auto-spot systems to fully autonomous operation. Semi-
autonomy, including teleoperation, is also possible. (Brown 2012) The machines 
generally use a combination of GPS and radar for localisation and obstacle detection, and 
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they also include a communication system that connects it to the mines central command 
system. (Marshall et al. 2016) Due to the benefits autonomous haul trucks introduce, they 
have  increased in adoption in recent years. For example, there are currently one hundred 
autonomous trucks similar to the one in figure 12 in active mining operations. (Watkins 
2017) 
Other areas of mining autonomy include autonomous functions for drill rigs and semi-
autonomous bulldozers. Blasthole surface drill rigs are machines that are used for drilling 
holes for explosive charges in surface mines. The autonomy of these machines is under 
active development and autonomous models will be available commercially in the near 
future. Functions that these machines will offer vary from teleoperation to partial 
autonomy, where the machine can drill a row of holes autonomously after an operator has 
drilled the starting hole. (Watkins 2017, Leach 2015) Autonomous surface mine 
bulldozers are also commercially available. At the moment, these machines offer semi-
autonomous operation, where an operator is needed to set up the task for the machine. 
After this, the machine is capable of carrying out the task independently. Such a task is, 
for example, push-to-edge functionality, where the machine pushes matter over the edge 
of the mine pit. (Watkins 2017, Jensen 2016) 
Other areas of autonomous mining under research include diggers, rock breakers and 
draglines. Most of these tasks are highly repetitive and suffer from the same hazards as 
other forms of mining machines.Therefore, these machines are well suited for the 
application of autonomy. However, some aspects are still under research, which is why 
these machines are not available commercially at the moment. For example, autonomous 
diggers are still under research as they suffer from the same bucket control problems as 
underground LHD machines: the intricate control of the bucket is challenging to perform 
autonomously due to the heterogeneous consistency and size of the rock matter. 
Autonomous diggers also require precise situational awareness to determine the terrain 
around the machine and the location and orientation of the bucket. Similar problems have 
been faced with the autonomy of rock breakers that are used to shatter large fragments of 
rock with a hydraulic hammer on the end of a boom. Precise situational awareness is also 
needed in the automation and autonomy of draglines, which are large machines with a 
bucket and mast, that are used to drag rock matter in open coal mines. Research and 
development on these machines are still ongoing. (Marshall et al. 2016) 
4.3.4 Mining systems and the mine of the future 
A mine consists of a vast number of different machines and vehicles, which all have 
varying degrees of autonomy and operate in the varying stages of the mining processes. 
Simultaneously, mines are also under pressure to work as efficiently and effectively as 
possible. These requirements have led to the widespread adoption of mine-wide control 
and monitoring systems, which cover all aspects of the mines operation to ensure 
productivity and efficiency, that have effectively turned modern mines into complex 
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systems-of-systems. A need for such a system was already recognised in the early stages 
of the modernisation of mining, as especially the introduction of autonomy in machines 
necessitates a central control and monitoring platform (Nebot 2007). The challenge with 
these systems is, however, that for them to work effectively they have to be implemented 
in all aspects of mine operations. This leads to an all-or-nothing approach that requires 
considerable financial investments.  
Mine systems are offered by several manufacturers and offer similar functionalities 
ranging from central communication systems to fleet management. The systems also 
integrate teleoperation functionalities, mine mapping functionalities and other tools. 
Traditionally, the systems are monitored and controlled from a separate control room, 
which may be, for example, a van on the mine site or an office completely separate from 
the mine premises.   
Fleet management is the most central part of the mine system in regard to the operation 
of machinery. It is traditionally tasked with three aspects: position monitoring, production 
monitoring and equipment task management. Position monitoring allows for the real time 
monitoring of each machine and vehicle in the mine, including the weights and types of 
material they are transporting, or the current drilling depth, for example. This allows for 
the effective performance tracking of the mine operations and precise task planning. 
Above all, this increases safety by minimising collision risks because the positions and 
routes of machines and vehicles can be actively monitored. The internal state of each 
machine can also be monitored by production monitoring, which gathers data such as 
machine cycle times, failures, payloads and so forth. The data can then be used to plan 
production accordingly. Lastly, assigning tasks for the equipment in use is a central part 
of fleet management. Production and position data are used by control room personnel to 
determine what tasks need to be carried out by the machines in operation. These tasks are 
then sent to each machine, which can be both manned or unmanned, through the fleet 
management system. The task is then put into action and it can be monitored in real time 
by the control room personnel. Effective fleet management has a direct effect on mine 
safety because it allows for real time monitoring of all operations, and thus allows for the 
elimination of risks related to collisions, as these are responsible for most safety incidents 
in modern mining. (Marshall et al. 2016) 
Standard ISO 17757 also sets requirements for the mining system, or as titled in the 
standard, the autonomous machine supervisor system. The standard recognises that risks 
may arise if the supervisor system sends out erroneous tasks to the machine, either due to 
operator error or a fault. To minimise risks, the connection between the supervisor system 
and the machine itself must be periodically verified. If there is found to be a problem in 
the communication system, the machine must be able to keep itself in a safe state without 
input from the control room. (ISO 17757:2017) 
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The ultimate goal for mining companies in implementing mine systems and mine 
autonomy is a mine that does not need personnel at the actual mine site at all. For example, 
in 2008, the mining company Rio Tinto initiated the Mine of the Future programme in its 
iron ore mines in Western Australia. The aim of the programme was to find new ways of 
mining that increase efficiency, safety and sustainability, while minimising 
environmental impacts. Autonomy has been a central part of the programme, with a vast 
number of autonomous machines operating in the Rio Tinto mines, which are all 
controlled by a central operations centre that is 1500 kilometres away. (Jensen 2016) 
4.4 Safety challenges in autonomous mining 
The increase in machine autonomy has numerous advantages in mining applications, 
ranging from increased productivity and efficiency to improved safety. For example, the 
safety benefits of autonomy are clear: with autonomy, the need to situate personnel in 
hazardous environments is minimised, or in some cases completely eliminated. 
Nonetheless, the increase in autonomy in mining applications brings with it safety 
challenges that must be overcome to ensure operational safety. Most of these challenges 
are similar to the challenges autonomy itself faces in mining applications, which were 
discussed in chapter 4.2. The safety challenges stem mostly from the operational 
environment of mining, which includes hazardous weather conditions and frequent 
interactions between machines and vehicles. 
The harsh environmental conditions of most mines has an adverse effect on sensors and 
their performance. The conditions range from extremely high or low temperatures to high 
humidity and to considerable amounts of dust. Especially underground mines are harsh 
environments, as they are dark, damp and humid. All of these aspects can possibly 
degrade sensory data or render it unavailable. As most autonomous machine functions 
are based on sensing and sensory data that are acquired by sensors mounted on the 
machine, the data are critical for the safe and effective performance of the machine (Nebot 
2007). Methods are needed to ensure the machine remains in a safe state even if there are 
lapses in the gathered sensory data. These methods include added robustness to the 
sensory systems and the ability for the autonomous system to sense missing or erroneous 
data.   
Another major challenge for safe autonomous mining machines stems from the 
interactions with other machines, vehicles and personnel. As most safety incidents in 
modern mines are the result of different forms of collisions, it is also a problem 
autonomous machines must face. Most of the incidents occur when machines collide 
while traversing the mine or in situations where two or more machines must interact 
together, for example, during dumping or loading rock matter. The root cause in these 
incidents is often poor visibility or problems in communication. (Marshall et al. 2016) 
Central mine command systems and the situational awareness of machines can minimise 
these hazards, but a great level of system integrity and fault tolerance is needed, as a great 
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weight is put on these systems to ensure safety in interactions with autonomous machines. 
For example, errors in task assignment or position monitoring can lead to high-speed 
collisions of machines if they are ordered to traverse the wrong route. Moreover, precise 
control and monitoring is also needed for situations where autonomous machines must 
interact with other machines or vehicles to ensure no collisions occur.  
A highly challenging form of interaction occurs when autonomous and non-autonomous 
machines must work together to perform a task. For example, such interaction can occur 
when an autonomous LHD machine dumps rock matter onto the bed of a manned mining 
truck, or when a manned and unmanned machine share a road together. These interactions 
require highly precise situational awareness and control with narrow margins for error to 
minimise the safety risks for the operator of the manned vehicles. Traditionally, these 
interactions have been eliminated by having the autonomous mining machines operate in 
cordoned off areas, where other machines and personnel cannot enter. For example, 
autonomous LHD machines often operate in separate tunnels that are closed off with 
gates, such as in the example in figure 13. If a person or machine enters through such a 
gate while autonomous operation is active in the tunnel, every machine is stopped 
automatically. In surface mining applications, the same functionality can be achieved by 
creating GPS perimeters that other machines cannot enter (Gustafson 2011).  
 
Figure 13. An example of a gate cordoning off an area of autonomous 
operation (Gustafson 2011) 
Separating autonomous and non-autonomous mining machines leads to the autonomy-
safety-paradox, which was discussed in chapter 3.9. By eliminating the interactions 
between different machines, an adequate level of safety is achieved. However, this limits 
the autonomous capabilities and effectiveness of the machines because they are only 
allowed to operate in certain areas and to carry out certain tasks. For example, in surface 
54 
mining some routes may only be traversed by autonomous machines, which means 
manned machines must wait for their turn or find another route. High situational 
awareness and intelligence of the machines would eliminate the need for such 
arrangements and would allow for machines with heterogeneous levels of autonomy to 
operate in the same area. Another simple solution would be an all-or-nothing approach to 
autonomy: if a mine is completely autonomous, all interactions with manned machines 
are eliminated and no risk is present. Such an approach, however, is not possible with 
current technology and, moreover would lead to considerable financial investments which 
mining companies may not be willing to partake in (Brown 2012).  
4.5 Other industrial autonomous machines 
In addition to mining, autonomy has been widely researched in other industrial fields 
including such areas as agriculture, transport, maritime applications and ship port 
automation, for example. Traditionally, fields that have either repetitive or hazardous 
work tasks have had the most to gain in adopting autonomy. For example, the autonomous 
possibilities in agriculture have been studied for a number of years (Torii 2000), which 
has led to commercial offerings being currently available. Agriculture is an area that can 
greatly benefit from autonomy because the work tasks are often repetitive and relatively 
simple in nature. Agriculture is relatively hazard-free, so no great benefits are gained from 
autonomy in this regard. However, autonomy does have the benefit of minimising 
operator contact with the poisonous insecticides that are used in agriculture (Pushpavalli 
et al. 2015).  
Work tasks in agriculture usually consist of traversing a field in a straight line, while 
spreading seeds or pesticide, ploughing, harvesting and so forth. As the fields are large, a 
single machine would have to traverse end-to-end several times to cover one field, which 
is why in agriculture fleets of machines often operate at the same time. This has led to the 
adoption of follow-me based autonomous and automatic systems, where one master 
vehicle, operated manually, is followed by one or more slave vehicles that are 
autonomous or automatic. (Zhang et al. 2010, Bedord 2017) Agriculture machines that 
operate independently of a master vehicle are also under research and some are available 
commercially (Torii 2000, Agriculture News 2008). These machines navigate with the 
use of GPS and on-board sensors. A remote operator is, however, still needed to monitor 
the machine. 
Other industrial fields that have utilised autonomy have used similar approaches. Most 
autonomous machines are tasked with performing straightforward functions 
independently, while an operator is used for monitoring and the execution of more 
complex tasks. Technology is, however, advancing rapidly, which can lead to more 
complex work tasks for autonomous machines with decreasing amounts of input and 
monitoring needed by machine operators.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Recent advancements in technology has allowed for the development of increasingly 
complex and intelligent autonomous industrial machines and civilian road vehicles. These 
machines and vehicles are able to act and make decisions independently and to perform 
functions that were a mere vision not too long ago. The increase in autonomy has, 
however, led to increased safety concerns. As autonomous machines and vehicles are able 
to operate without the supervision or control of a separate operator or driver, concerns 
arise on how to ensure an adequate level of safety in all operational situations. 
In this thesis, the main aspects that affect overall safety of autonomous machines, vehicles 
and the design of systems were presented. Additionally, the main safety challenges of 
increasing autonomy in machines and vehicles were also discussed. The ultimate goal of 
the thesis was to give an overview on what safety-related aspects have to be considered 
to achieve an adequate level of safety for autonomous machines and vehicles.  
The safety of an autonomous machine or vehicle is the combination of both safety-
specific functionalities and overall correct operation of the machine or vehicle in all 
situations. To ensure an adequate level of safety, these aspects have to be considered in 
the design phase of the machine, as autonomy cannot be regarded as a mere feature, but 
rather as an all-encompassing aspect of the machine.  
The main safety challenges that arise from the increase of autonomy in machines and 
vehicles include areas such as building suitable system architectures, creating effective 
situational awareness capabilities, as well as ensuring the correct localisation and motion 
planning of the autonomous machine. Moreover, the increase in autonomy introduces 
questions and concerns relating to the internal risk assessment and decision-making 
capabilities of the machines and vehicles, which ultimately can lead to moral and ethical 
dilemmas. All of these aspects are equally important for the safe operation of an 
autonomous machine, as any errors or faults in these areas can lead to undesired and 
erroneous behaviour, possibly leading to safety hazards and incidents, or even fatalities. 
Ultimately, the difficulty in creating safe and effective autonomous machines and 
vehicles is due to two main correlating aspects. First, increasing autonomy in machines 
and vehicles can be seen as a paradox of sorts. The intent of the manufacturers of 
autonomous machines and vehicles is often to create an autonomous system that is as 
advanced as possible, so that they can compete with other manufacturers effectively. 
Simultaneously, the autonomous system must also be as safe as possible, which can 
ultimately limit the autonomous capabilities of the system. In other words, the increase 
in safety can often come at the expense of autonomy and vice-a-versa, the increase in 
autonomy can often come at the expense of safety. Designing a safe, effective and 
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sophisticated autonomous machine or vehicle can also be said to be controlled by a triple 
constraint that comprises safety, the level of autonomy and the complexity of the 
machine’s functions. Therefore, changing any of these three aspects necessitates 
alterations in the other two, as for example, the increase in the level of autonomy 
necessitates an increase in safety and changes in the machine’s corresponding functions, 
if a safe and sophisticated machine is desired.  
The second reason for difficulties in designing safe autonomous machines and vehicles 
is the lack of appropriate legislation, standards and other guidelines on how autonomy 
should be implemented in practice. Both autonomous civilian road vehicles and industrial 
autonomous machines are hampered by bottlenecks in this regard. In the field of civilian 
road vehicles, some legislation and standards have been passed that offer guidelines on 
how autonomous vehicles should be designed and what steps must be taken before they 
can be used on public roads. Guidelines have also been put in place on ways to categorise 
the levels of autonomy of road vehicles, such as by the NHTSA and SAE International. 
These categorisations can then be used to create more specific legislation and guidelines 
on ensuring safety for specific levels of autonomy. Currently, however, only a select few 
of such legislation and guidelines are available. In industrial fields, on the other hand, the 
situation is difficult. At the time of writing, only two standards by the major standardising 
organisations are known to exist regarding the autonomy of industrial machines: the very 
recently released standard ISO 17757 on the autonomy of mining haulage machines, and 
the standard ISO 18497 on autonomous agriculture, which is still under development. 
Therefore, very little information and few guidelines are available for industrial 
manufacturers on how autonomy should be implemented in practice and how safety of 
such machines should be ensured. Moreover, as no guidelines are available, there is 
currently no common method for classifying the levels of autonomy in industrial 
machines. Therefore, future standards and guidelines can be challenging to apply in 
practice to machines, as there is no commonly accepted way to separate machines based 
on their autonomy. Ultimately, the resonsibility for ensuring the safety of autonomous 
industrial machines in practice is on the shoulders of manufacturers alone – at least at the 
moment. Therefore, the advances made in the automotive field in this regard could be 
used as a guide of sorts for industrial applications. For example, a classification method 
for autonomous industrial machines could be produced based on the guidelines by the 
NHTSA and SAE International.  
As this thesis was conducted as a literature review, no real-world tests or practical 
examinations were carried out on specific autonomous machines. Rather, mining 
autonomy was used as an example of industrial autonomy in practice, which was also 
used to demonstrate the types of problems and challenges safe autonomy can face in 
practice. Continuing this research, real-world tests could be carried out on differing 
autonomous machines in usage and data could thus be gathered on the different safety-
related aspects of autonomous machines presented in this thesis. This data could then be 
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used to compare how different safety methods affect overall machine safety in 
autonomous applications. 
In the future, it is certain that autonomous machines and vehicles will enjoy continued 
rapid advancements in technology. As the field of autonomy matures, new standards and 
other legislation will become available for manufacturers and developers to ensure 
autonomous machines and vehicles operate safely and correctly, without introducing 
hazards. It is to be hoped, however, that this happens sooner rather than later, so that the 
full benefit of autonomous technologies can be taken advantage of as soon as possible. 
Ultimately, autonomy will be an increasing part of everyday life and operations both in 
civilian and industrial applications because the vision of self-driving cars and self-
operating machines is very near. 
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